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ABSTRACT: 
Cameroon has since launched a restructuring of its forest resource management in 1994, predicted on the 
assumption that positive socio economic change, popular participation and, poverty alleviation will be 
achieved from the transfer of decision making functions and management responsibilities and benefits to 
local communities.  
 
The local communities saw the advent of the forest legislation which outlined the transfer of the forest 
management responsibilities to them as a response to their age old demand of access to financial benefit 
from forest and local development. However, detailed examination proves that decentralized forms of 
local natural resource management often fail to produce desired results such as responsible representation, 
democracy and local development. 
 
This study therefore seeks to examine why the implementation of decision making in decentralized forest 
resource management has failed to achieve desired results of sustainable forest resource management and 
local development in the Dimako Council and Kongo Community Forests. It further examines the 
possible implications of the failure of this policy on the development of the local community and country 
as whole.  
 
The decision theory constitute the framework of analysis in this study and the study is mainly qualitative, 
based on desk review which consists of survey of existing relevant literature, interviews, selected case 
studies of Dimako and Kongo Council and Community Forest respectively and document analysis  
 
Findings suggest that, the decentralization of forest management in Cameroon is finally an interrupted 
process, obstructed halfway by regional level forces who are considered as mid-level actors and by local 
community chiefs. Most of those who make up members of council and community forest management 
committees are nominated, co-opted and not voted. The same persons keep rotating and acting as 
councilors and at the same time as members of the local development committee as well as members of 
the forest resource management committees. More so, these committees work together with the Major 
and seal deals with the elites and do not feel accountable to the local population. The Mayor serves as the 
sole decision maker in matters that have to do with council forest management and its proceeds.   
 
Therefore, many factors account for the failure of this new reform to achieve desired results and these 
include; Limited transfer of decision making functions to the committees and tendencies of centralization, 
mismanagement of decision making functions, decision making traps among others. Cameroon 
government should therefore democratize local government first, implement capacity building before 
devolution of power, develop and enforce an ethical code, institute and implement ethics as part of the 
management committee training and orientation programs, incorporate ethics as part of performance 
evaluation and create an ethical environment to ensure that the actions of senior officials are consistent 
with expectations. 
 
KEY WORDS: decentralization, forest resource management, decision making, Cameroon, forestry  
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1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Cameroon is located within the Congo Basin, and about one third of the territory is 
sheltered by forest which is marked by its diversity and richness. It is predicted that 
approximately 4 million people frankly depend on the forests as home and sources of 
income for their survival. In fact, a vital role is played by Forest in the economic 
development of Cameroon, making up 6% of the national GDP and yielding some 100 
million dollars each year in logging taxes. Cameroon exports roughly 2.5 million cubic 
meters of timber each year. (Forest transparency info 2013.) 
 
Public administration in the forest sector in Cameroon is implemented through the 
administration and implementation of the stipulations of the forest policy reform. The 
forest sector in Cameroon has since been headed and supervised by the Ministry of 
Forestry and Wildlife. Decree No 95/678/PM of December 1995 set up an incentive 
frame work for the use of forest, with an introduction of the zoning plan for the 
country’s forest. In this respect, the forest sector in Cameroon falls under the ministry of 
forestry and wild life and which is charged with the responsibility of publishing the map 
of the Cameroon forest with the zoning plan. Notwithstanding, several ministries also 
play an administrative role in the management of the Cameroon forest due to the variety 
of activities that are carried out in the forest. These include the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of commerce, the Ministry in charge of environmental protection, Ministry of 
mines and power, Nongovernmental organizations and councils and communities. 
However, the sole responsibility and management of the forest lies in the Ministry of 
Forestry and Wildlife. While the Ministry of Finance is responsible for forest tax, the 
Ministry of Mines collaborates with the Ministry of forestry to come in and organize 
mining activities in the forest. (Amariei 2005.) 
 
 On the other hand, local administrative offices, headed by appointed officials of the 
central government are charged with the responsibilities of implementing at the 
municipal level, decisions and actions adopted by the national government, while, 
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communes with communal forest receive a percentage of the annual forest tax from the 
government. These communes are headed by elected mayors who serve as 
representatives of the local population. 
 
Notwithstanding the administration and or management of the forest by these ministries, 
the private sector also plays a role in the management and administration of the forest. 
For instance, foreign forestry companies such as the European and Asian companies, 
Mining companies and hunting guides all operate in the forest and under the private 
sector. However, in spite of the numerous actors involved in the administration of forest 
in Cameroon, the overall activities of the forest are supervised by the central 
government delegate in charge of the forest which in this case is the Ministry of 
Forestry and Wildlife. (MINEF 1998a; Nguiffo 2009.) 
 
In this regard, the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife is charged with the responsibilities 
of ensuring the publication of the key texts on forest management. These include; 
 “The 1993 forest policy document, 
 The 1994 Forestry Law covering the management of forest, wildlife and fisheries, 
 Decrees implementing the 1994 law and the 1995 decree for the forest sector, 
 Other statutory texts (decrees, circulas).” (Nguiffo 2009:14.) 
 
However, as noted by transparency report (2009), the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife 
has failed in its responsibilities especially in the domain of disseminating information 
on forest management. As noted in the text, some valuable documents remain invisible 
from the list of disseminated documents. These include; related tax documents that have 
to do with forest management such as the text related to the Mining sector, finance law 
to name a few. Moreover, the text also states that, the manner in which the information 
is disseminated is not effective as local communities are deprived even of the means to 
access the document due to the fact that local officials do not have access to the 
appropriate documents. 
 
Notwithstanding, public administration in the forest sector in Cameroon has gone 
through a number of reforms. However, it is worthy to note that Cameroon has 
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witnessed a long history of institutional and regulatory settings in its forest sector. This 
can be traced to 1884 when the German colonial administrators and later the French and 
British (1919-1960/1961), introduced and formalized a new form of administrative 
system within which administrative units were put in place, some of which to regulate 
the forestry sector to the exclusion of the local population. Even though Cameroon 
adopted successful forest laws in 1974 and 1981 respectively after its independence, it is 
worthy to note that it was only later in 1994 that a comprehensive framework that links 
the concept of sustainable forest management directly with the preparation of forest 
management plans of all productive forest was introduced and developed following the 
launching of the new forest legislative law of 1994. (Cerutti et al. 2008:1.) 
 
This new forest reform is contained in the January 1994 Forest Laws stipulated by the 
Presidential Decree No 94/436/PM on the appliance of the Forest Regime (August 
1994). In addition to this, Système Informatique de Gestion d'Information Forestière 
(SIGIF; Digitalized Forest Management Information System) was also set up in 2002 as 
part of the reform to play a supportive role with respect to the realization of the existing 
reform (MINEF 2004). As noted by ODI (2004), this forest law was meant to increase 
efficiency in the forest sector and also to promote active involvement and participation 
of the local community in forest resource management. 
 
In this respect, the forest law from 1994 coordinates and legislate the relationship 
amidst the state and other stake holders groups that take part in forest management, 
collecting, processing and selling of forest products such as concessionaires, industries, 
private forest owners, forest communities, and communes. In accordance to art 20, of 
the republic of Cameroon forestry law 1994, Cameroon forest was divided into two; 
“Land permanently allocated to forests and or wild life habitat, (permanent forest)” such 
as fauna protecting areas, forest reserves and communal forest, and “Forested land that 
can be allocated potentially for other users” know as non-permanent forest and include; 
national forest, community forest and private forest. (COMIFAC 2004; MINEF 2004.) 
Similarly, the 1994 Forest Law also obligates the production forest, be it community, 
municipal or national forest to establish a three year management plan but as noted by 
Amariei (2005), the implementations of forest management plans are delayed due to the 
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absence of adequate thorough information and human resources at the level of the 
ministry which serves as the providing body.  
 
She further notes that, the 1994 Forest law/reform which led to the division of the forest 
into permanent and non-permanent forest, gave rise to the development and 
establishment of community forest in Cameroon. The PFA has an expansion of 
8.9million Ha which includes 2.6 million Ha confined areas, 300,000 Ha as a proportion 
set aside for community management, and 6 million Ha which is classified as Forest 
Management Units (FMU). As earlier mentioned, it is obligatory for all forest 
management units to have a management plan within the initial 3 years of operation (as 
stipulated by the “Provisional Convention”), with a felling cycle set at 30 years (MINEF 
2001). With this new development, it was hoped that the involvement of local 
communities as actors and users of forest resources would give them the opportunity of 
developing a sense of ownership and thereby, increase interest in input and partaking in 
forest management resources as well as guarantee the sustainable utilization of forest 
resources.  
 
As the Ministry of Environment and Forests (1999) and Amariei (2005) further 
articulate, the new institutional arrangement which gave rise to the emerging of 
community forestry sector is a means of decentralizing forest management and putting 
in place, an ownership right over forest resources that takes into considerations the 
livelihood of the community living close to or in the forest. In this regard and in 
accordance with the simple management plan, the rights to manage up to 5000HA of 
forest on a rotation of 25 years were given to the community. Up to this day, the 
government has given   his approval to 55 community forests with the highest 
community forest yielding approximately 5-10m/HA/year. (Fomete 2002.) 
 
However, even though the community forest in Cameroon is becoming well established 
today, the absence of management and technical services remains a key constrain to the 
rate of change when it comes to the maintenance and sustainability of the community 
forest. The slow pace of change has often been attributed to mismanagement of decision 
making functions as a result of corruption and patron client relationship, upward 
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accountability instead of downward accountability which is a requirement of 
decentralization as a policy per say. The major reforms and their relation to the 1994 
law can be summarized as such; 
 
 
Table 1. Forest reform procedures and linkages to the forest law (Bureau Veritas 
Certification 2006:3). 
 
Area of 
Reform 
1994 Forest Law Bank supported measures 
F
o
re
st
 
zo
n
in
g
 
Classification of the forest estate into 
permanent production forests, protected 
areas, and rural areas.  
Adoption of a national strategy for forest 
concession planning, taking into account 
requirements for sustainable forest 
management.  
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 
fo
re
st
ry
 
Establishment of rights for local 
communities to manage community or 
local council forests through a 
contractual relationship with the 
administration.  
Adoption of a right for the local communities 
to pre-empt neighbouring forests from being 
earmarked as ventes de coupe (where logging 
is permitted on a maximum of 2,500 hectares 
for a maximum of three years)  
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
le
 f
o
re
st
 
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t 
Introduction of forest management 
plans implemented by private firms in 
permanent production forests and 
monitored by the Forest 
Administration.  
Adoption of procedures to prepare, approve, 
and monitor forest management plans. 
Selection of international nongovernmental 
organizations to monitor and assess the 
implementation of forest management plans 
on the ground.  
F
o
re
st
 t
a
x
a
ti
o
n
 
Mention of a system to redistribute a 
portion of the area tax to local councils 
and communities.  
Adoption of reforms in forest taxation, 
including the creation of a program to 
enhance forest tax revenue (through better 
monitoring and recovery of forest taxes) and a 
system for redistributing annual area revenues 
(the state to receive 50 percent, local councils 
40 percent, and local communities 10 
percent).  
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1.2. Research problem 
 
Since the 1990s, Cameroon has made “bold” public administrative reforms (Ribot et al., 
2006:7). One of which was the decentralization of its forest resource management 
which came as a reaction to demands for “democracy, justice, human wellbeing and 
donor requirements for good governance”. Cameroon has since then, launched a 
restructuring of its forest resource management in 1994, predicted on the assumption 
that positive socio economic change, social justice, popular participation in the 
management of the forest and environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation will be 
achieved from the transfer of decision making functions and management 
responsibilities and benefits to local communities. It was hoped that local authorities or 
representatives of government by virtue of their proximity to the local population they 
serve, will improve accountability to the local population and better combine resources 
to meet the needs, interest and aspirations of the local people. (Ribot et al. 2006:7; 
Oyono 2005:318.) In this regard, the new administrative reform (decentralization of 
forest resource management) implied responsible representation, local democracy and 
downward accountability by local authorities/officials to the local population with the 
view of achieving equity and improved wellbeing.  
 
However, case studies of such reforms in the natural resource management 
decentralization in Uganda, Senegal, Nepal to name a few prove that the necessary 
institutional arrangements for the expected outcomes are scarcely observed as most of 
such reforms face stiff resistance from different actors which erode their effectiveness 
(Ribot et al. 2006:2).  In this regard, Peters and Jon (1998) note that, administrative 
reforms are “path-dependent” possibly to a higher extend than it is realized generally 
because reforms strategies are rooted in systems of administrative practices and norms. 
As such, administrative reforms are fashioned to a greater extend by what has been in 
existence long ago than by the preferred model of public administration.  
Notwithstanding, reviews on natural resource management and decentralization suggest 
that, the local population could profit from the redistribution of centralized 
administrative authority. On the other end, detailed examinations of reviews on 
decentralization research in Sub Sahara Africa in the name of reforms have produced 
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mixed results since the 1990s as their portrayal brought up parameters of total loss and 
stagnation in others especially when applied to the case of natural resource 
management. (Kasfir 1983; Oyugi 1983; Fjeldstad 2002;  Kassibo 2002; Bazaara 2003; 
Lungusile 2003; Etoungou 2003; Mapedza 2003.) 
 
Local communities in Cameroon have long been frustrated by their exclusion from the 
public system of forest management as far as the colonial period. For these reasons, the 
local communities saw the advent of the forest legislation which outlined the transfer of 
the forest management responsibilities to them as a response to their age old demand of 
access to financial benefit from forest. The administrative policy change was thus 
perceived by many as; the response by the central government to “environmental 
injustice and their historical frustrations” (Oyono 2005: 318). However, detailed 
examination proves that “community-based and decentralized forms of local natural 
resource management often fail to produce responsible representation and downward 
accountability and are not democratic”,  as the world bank (2000: 107) states 
“…decentralization is often implemented haphazardly”.  This is visible in the East 
region and most forest zones of Cameroon where poorly structured decentralization and 
transfer of administrative power to unaccountable local bodies threaten local equity, 
democracy and environmental management (Ribot 2003:54) to the detriment of the 
local population.  
 
1.2.1. Objectives and Research Questions 
 
This paper seeks to examine public administration policies in Cameroon with regards to 
forest resource management. In this respect, it looks at the implementation of decision 
making in decentralized forest resource management policy in Cameroon. It further 
describes decentralized forest management and its operational mechanisms in relation to 
the local population. Particularly, it examines the administrative process of the 
implementation of this policy in the light of the administrative behavior of the 
administrators, and the implications of such behaviors on the community and country as 
a whole. The research questions are; 
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1) Why has the implementation of decision making in decentralized forest resource 
management failed to achieve the desired results of sustainable forest resource 
management and local development in the Dimako Council and Kongo Community 
Forests? 
2)  What are the possible implications and outcomes of the failure of the implementation 
of these managerial decisions on the development of the local community and country 
as whole? 
 
1.3. Justification of Study 
 
This topic is carefully selected by the researcher because, forest resource management 
represent one of such strategic areas in the Cameroon as it serves as one of the country’s 
main source of income. A substantial amount of revenue accrues from logging and fees 
from the forest. As such, it is very imperative to tackle these area carefully otherwise, 
huge amounts of money which are meant for the government and the population will not 
be realized as a result of misuse of managerial decision making functions and 
corruption. 
 
The goal of this chapter has been to give a general introduction and back ground 
information on the topic under study. The research problem has been stated and the 
objectives of the study as well as the question set for the research has been put forward. 
The study is demarcated geographically to include only Cameroon. The proceeding 
chapter analyses the central theory and concepts of this study and how they interrelate. 
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2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section defines the major concepts and their theoretical linkages to the case study. 
It also summarizes conceptual and theoretical issues that will be relevant in the study.  
 
 
2.1. Public Administration 
 
It would be difficult, and probably unhelpful, if I were to provide an “overly specific 
definition” of public administration (Court & Young 2005: 1)., because, as a concept, it 
has no ‘one-size-fits all’ definition and, in most cases, what is used is a contextual 
definition of public administration as it is in itself a multi-dimensional concept that has 
carried very different meanings as it can be situated within a field of practice as well as 
a field of study.  
 
However, notwithstanding the context of its usage, public administration implies the 
activity or course of administering public affairs and executing government functions. 
As a practice, it entails making decisions on the superlative policies with regards to an 
issue as well as setting principles and processes. As a study, it focuses on the manner in 
which policy is made and implemented, the attitude and behavior of public officials as 
they execute their duties, leadership approach of public managers, mechanisms 
embraced by poverty focused programs, the  associations of government and the 
citizens to name a few. (Waldo 1955.) According to Caiden (1971), Public 
administration also has practical relevance for government principally in improving 
government performance. It is therefore liable to public scrutiny, public prospects and 
demands, political pressure, public expectations of accountability and transparency in 
transactions. Public administration is open to everyone and is geared towards general 
public satisfaction which determines progress in the quality of life of the citizens 
(Bitonio 2012). Its main goal is to advance management and polices to enable 
government to work. It is worthy to note that contemporary practices of public 
administration draw major strength from precedent models. One of which is the Neo-
bureaucratic model framed upon rational decision making processes. (Denhardt 2003.) 
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This paper therefore, adopts a working meaning of public administration as, the 
management of public policies as well as government decision making and the analysis 
of these policies themselves. In this respect, public administration is analyzed in this 
paper with regards to the implementation of the forest resource management 
decentralization policy in Cameroon. For the purpose of understanding, management 
and administration will be used inter changeably in this study to mean the same thing. 
 
 
2.2. Decentralization  
 
Decentralization is broadly defined as a “process of shift or transfer of powers, 
responsibilities and resources from the centre state to lower territorial units and or 
locally elected bodies and authorities.” (Oyono 2004a; 2005:317; Carney & Farrington 
1998; Ribot 2006.) Several forms of decentralization have been identified. They 
include; 
 
i. “De-concentration or administrative/territorial decentralization; when the 
central state redistributes authority to its own representatives within defined 
geographical units; 
ii. Privatization ; the transfer of powers from the central state to non-state entities; 
iii. Delegation; when specific powers are transferred to semi-independent units; 
iv. Devolution or democratic decentralisation; a process aimed at transferring 
powers to the local governments and to authorities representatives of and 
accountable to, local population.”(Oyono 2004a:92.) 
 
As noted by Larson (2003: 211), decentralization of central government is a device for 
enhancing development even though decentralization practitioners and researchers have 
paid relatively lower attention to other traits of development such as natural resource 
management. However, Decentralization of forest resource management here refers to 
the transfer or shift of administrative decision making and management of forest 
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resource from the center to the local government and to authority’s representatives of 
and accountable to, local population. This is thus, decentralization of natural resources 
management based on “responsible representation and accountability” by locally elected 
authorities and decentralized entities representing the local population. It is hoped that 
through devolution, aspects of decision-making will be transferred to other actors and 
local population and as a result, “broad based participation, efficiency of public service 
provisions, empowerment of local citizens and local democracy” will be achieved as 
theorists believe that  “downwardly accountable or representative authorities with 
meaningful discretionary powers are the basic institutional elements of decentralization 
that should lead to local efficiency, equity and development.” (Oyono 2004b:2; Ribot 
2003:53.)  As Ribot (2003) further notes, such decentralization through Africa are 
restructuring the local institutions that manage natural resources in manners that would 
intensely  affect  who uses, manages and benefit from these resources. 
 
On the other hand, Tacconi et al argued that “while decentralization is often describe to 
have a potential to bring about sustainable forest management, the complex linkages 
existing amongst decentralization, forest management and livelihood imply that it is not 
possible to state a priori whether decentralization would lead to sustainable forest 
management and to increased livelihood benefit.”(2006: 1.) 
 
Furthermore they went ahead to state that “political and administrative devolution of 
government authority does not necessary imply devolution of control over forest 
resources to lower level government or to private stakeholders, including local 
community rather, decentralized resource management can also be used to refer to 
“common pool resource management.” (2006:2.) They also argued contrary to Ribot 
and Oyono that it is not because the government fails to transfer sufficient power to 
local institution that the authorities and officials fail to represent and are unaccountable 
to local communities but it is due to the fact that  representative decision making 
processes  of most developing countries are weak and as a result, it is easier for local 
elites and vested interest groups to manipulate the institutions and opportunities created 
by decentralization for their own interest. More so, as Eversole (2011) further notes, 
awareness in participatory governance takes into considerations the fact that 
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communities can offer contributions of great value to the management of the 
community resources and governance but efforts to strengthen community participation 
face challenges label as incompleteness or failure of participatory democracy and or 
governance. 
 
They however state that, various studies on decentralization has rarely ever brought 
about improved governance through the promotion of local accountability and 
transparency and by promoting local democracy or administrative decision making. To 
them, the above ramification is an indication that “decentralization cannot be expected 
to create an ideal democratic and accountable governance system overnight. Therefore 
democratic decentralization might not lead to the scaling up of community based natural 
resource management”. (Tacconi et al. 2006:4.) As Steiner (2007) further notes, 
decentralization is well-thought-out to affect poverty through the provision of 
opportunities that enable previously excluded people to take part in public decision 
making and many other services but in most cases like the case of Uganda, these 
channels often times are not fully realized in practice as a result of restricted local 
autonomy, patronage relationship, corruption to name a few. 
 
I have defined public administration and have pointed out that it entails making 
decisions on the superlative policies with regards to an issue as well as setting principles 
and processes. I have also defined and brief on forest resource management and 
decentralization to show how public administration policies could work based on the 
transfer or shift of administrative decision making and management from the center to 
local authorities. However, some authors have argued that such transfer of decision 
making power to local entities does not necessarily produce desired results. In this 
regard, the theory of administration and decision making is further analyzed. 
 
 
2.3. Principles of administration 
 
According to Simon (1997:1 29-30), administration is discussed simply as “getting 
things done” with a focus on methods and processes of ensuring keen actions. To this 
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effect, principles are put in place to ensure and secure concerted actions from groups of 
individuals. These principles constitute the administrative theory. In line with this view, 
Simon (1997: 29-30) has further outlined some of the general accepted principles of 
administration which holds that; 
 
 “Administrative efficiency is increased by specialization of the task among the 
group. 
 Administrative efficiency is increased by arranging the members of the group in 
a determinate hierarchy of authority. 
 Administrative efficiency is increased by limiting the span of control at any point 
in the hierarchy to a small number 
 Administrative efficiency is increased by grouping the workers, for purposes of 
control, according to purpose, process, clientele and place”. (Simon 1997: 29-
30.) 
 
However, these well explicit principles have been heavily criticized by authors who 
argue that their validity cannot be so easily submitted to empirical test. The principle of 
specialization have been criticized on the claim that, it is not a precondition or condition 
for efficient administration as it only entails that different individuals are doing different 
things. As such, the actual challenge of administration is not specialization but 
specialization in a specific way and path that will influence administrative efficiency. 
The second principle, unity of command has been criticized for its rigid nature and the 
fact that it is basically not possible for an individual to obey two contradictory 
commands. As such, this principle is only feasible if a subordinate is answerable to a 
specific authority. The third principle has been criticized on the basis of repetition and 
the fact that the outcomes of the principle in practice are contradictory to its 
expectations and the last principle has also been criticized for the absence of a criterion 
of specialization. (Gulick & Urwick 1937.) 
 
Administrative principles more or less demonstrate some sort of decentralization in the 
administration of activities or policies but as argued by some authors, the objection or 
critics of these principles drives on to the centralization versus decentralization debate 
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which usually ends up with the conclusion on the one end that centralization of decision 
making functions is advantageous   and on the other end that there are crystal-clear 
advantages of decentralization as well. (Urwick 1945.) Faced with such controversy, it 
would be better and probably wiser to consider the conditions under which one of these 
approaches is most feasible. 
 
Based on these notes, this author notes that, administrative processes or managerial 
processes are decisional processes. This makes it of course inevitable for one to study 
administration and management without going through the decision making process. It 
is for these reasons that, this author further analyze decision making in administration 
and management as the center theory of this study. 
 
 
2.4. Decision theory 
 
According to Buchanab Leigh and O’Connel Andrew (2006:33), the term Decision 
denotes the conclusion of deliberation and the commencement of action. As they further 
articulate, the queries of who makes decisions, and in what manner, have molded the 
world’s structures of government, social order and justice. In effect, “Life is the sum of 
all human choices” and history, by inference, equals the amassed choices of all 
humanity. As they argued, the history of decision-making and approaches is not one of 
absolute progress that is headed for flawless rationalism as we have gradually been 
acknowledging the constraints both psychological and contextual on our ability to make 
best or ideal choices over the years. Challenging circumstances, inadequate mental 
computational power and limited time, lessen decision makers to a state of “bounded 
rationality.” Confronted with the decision making imperfectabilities, ways have been 
soughed by theorists to attain, at least acceptable if not optimal outcomes. Some 
theorists urge us to create a virtue of our limited time and knowledge by grasping 
simple heuristics, a method they call “fast and frugal” reasoning, others suggest 
“humble decision making,” a collection of non-heroic strategies that comprise delay, 
tentativeness and hedging while still, some have simply returned to the ancient ways. 
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 Decision making thus has a long history and has since evolved from the prehistoric 
period where human decisions were directed by interpretations of entrails, dreams, 
smoke, and even more. During that time, hundreds of cohorts of Chinese depend on the 
divination instructions and poetic wisdom assembled in the I Ching while the Greeks 
look up to the Oracle of Delphi and the future was forecasts by seers and prophets and 
seers of all sorts. Decision making has since evolved from this stage through till the 
19th century where Buchanab  and O’Connel  (2006) note that Chester Barnard  was 
able to split up personal from organizational decision making to clarify why some 
employees act in the interest of the organizational rather than in their own  and till 
present day where they note that Malcolm Gladwell explores the concept that our 
prompt or sudden decisions are at times better than those founded on lengthy, rational 
analysis. 
 
The decision theory thus deals with human decision making in a world of partial 
information and incomplete human control over events. It is posited on two players; a 
cognitive human who is refer to as the decision maker who makes calculations, perform 
analyses and cognitively takes a decision on a course of action in an endeavor to 
optimize his or her own welfare and a randomizing nature that gleefully selects courses 
of action solely in a probabilistic way. 
 
State of nature and acts make up the two basic concepts of the decision theory. While 
state of nature  are solely under the control of nature and are beyond the influence of the 
decision maker, acts on the other end, are subject to the control of the decision maker 
and the decision maker can select any one of the available acts. The human decision 
maker therefore provides beliefs and preferences as resolutions of a decision problem. 
To this effect, the decision theory postulates that, the decision maker has a probability 
system that confines his or her partial beliefs about the selection of states by nature and 
a structure of preference over the outcomes. Decision making is therefore composed of 
a two-step process; first, the acts are ordered by assigning numbers to the acts and 
secondly, the best act is chosen based on whether the expected outcomes are good or 
bad. (Clement1990; Bernstein 1996.) Probability sampling of decisions and decision 
22 
 
 
making rules is what this paper will not go in to reasons being that, decision making in 
this study is only relevant to administrative organization. 
 
2.4.1. Decision making 
 
As stated by Natale, Libertella, and Rothschild (1995), a decision is a selection between 
two alternatives. Such courses of action are chosen by administrators and or managers 
not for themselves but for the administration and entire public. Those at the top of the 
administration may take decisions or make managerial decisions which have a strong 
impact not only on everyone who works with that administration but the entire public. 
In this respect, administrators and or managers cannot afford to make casual decisions. 
Administrators must therefore learn to approach decisions with importance to the 
decision process. The primary motive of making any decision is to set up and achieve 
administrative objectives and goals 
 
Decisions are further categorize in to two. These include decisions that are common to 
the managers such as scheduling, recruitment, selection and firing. On the other end are 
uncommon decisions which are taking by public administrators as well as managers on 
a less frequent basis and have long term effect on the entire population. These may 
include; changes in strategies such as the case of decentralization policy, allocation of 
resources to name a few. It is worthy to note that, administration is a continuous 
process, an ongoing entity and as such, decisions made today might have severe 
consequences in future. This is why a skillful and knowledgeable administrator must 
look towards the future effect of a decision before adopting it. 
 
All aspect of administration and management are affected by decision making. Decision 
making is therefore part of every administrator’s job. It is thus, an integral part of the 
administration of any kind of public policy and as noted by Dawson (1993), competence 
in this activity is what differentiates the administrator from non-administrators. 
Decisions for administrators span from relatively unimportant to crucial ones and an 
administrator can determine the importance of a decision by posing   a series of 
questions such as; 
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 What will be the effect of this decision on the overall goal and objectives of this 
policy? 
 What proportion of the population will be affected? 
 What amount of resources is involved? 
 What is the relative occurrence of this type of decision? 
 
Answers to such questions give the administrator or manager the possibility to prioritize 
the decisions to be made in order of preference or importance. The administrator is then 
expected to spend more time on the prioritize decisions once this is done (Phillips 
1995).  
 
On the other end, Organizational, personnel, program or budgets constitute the more or 
less general type of problems encountered by the public sector manager and these also 
laid the foundation for the demands of effective decision making as well as the structure 
of a regular decision situation. A typical decision situation that pertains to program 
takes into considerations, administration and cost effectiveness, allocation, efficiency, 
selection and planning while a typical decision situation that pertains to budgets takes 
into considerations the policy and structure which includes legislation and operating 
cost. On the other end, personnel management also constitutes another typical decision 
which situation which includes decision pertaining to confrontation such as dismissal, 
retirement, demotion, training, classification and placement. As such, the type of 
decision situation determines the structure of decisions in the public sector (Clerk & 
Shrode 1979). 
 
However, decision making at the level of the community and natural resource 
management is entirely a different thing and requires democracy and community 
participation in the execution of decisions. Research conducted in two Southern 
communities with regards to community decision making found community 
administrators to be highly involved in and dominant over community decision making 
(Jennings 1963).  
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2.4.2. Ethical Decision Making 
 
Ethics comprises of the standard of behavior that is accepted by our society. It refers to 
well established standards of right and wrong that states what individuals should do, 
generally in terms of right requirements, fairness and benefit of society. Acting 
constantly in conformity to a set of principles or values give rise to an ethical system. 
The system is judged to be good or moral to the extent that it empowers and add more 
value to the community and the individuals who make up the community. (Thompson 
1988.) We express ethics in our actions and the decisions we make every day as public 
administrators to work for the public interest rather than personal gain and interest. As 
such, ethics entails selflessness and sacrifices which is the major criterion for honesty in 
public administrators. (Fleishman 1987.) The need of the community to be well-versed 
such that officials are answerable to the public in theory as well as in reality and the 
necessity for the citizens to develop a sense of trust in public administrators established 
on the citizen’s conclusion that administrators are inspired in their actions by concern 
with the wide interest of community and not by constricted interest of self-ambition are 
the two important standards in a democratic society. (Richter, Burke & Doig 1990.) 
 
The incorporation of this ethics principle constitutes the frame work for an ethical 
system (York 1988). This includes; conformity to the law and honesty which entails 
commitment to speak the truth, fulfill promises and abide by the law as fundamental to 
ethical conduct; democratic responsibility which is essential to encourage and achieve a 
high level of interaction with groups and citizens that have assorted perspectives in 
pursuing a public interest; Public interest: here, justice is a principal rule of operation in 
trailing the public interest and evading any conflict interest. It is the responsibility of 
public officials to pursue the public interest and understand that the welfare and needs 
of a majority of citizens are greater than personal needs. Therefore, the dissemination of 
benefits and the subsequent financial burden should result in the equivalent treatment 
for all. (Bonczek 1992.) The values of any organizations are thus echoed in the quality 
of decisions that are arrived at and more so, where a public office happens to be a public 
trust, the questions of ethics have a specific impact. Administrators with real 
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responsibilities contend that long term achievement is centrally reliant on credibility, 
reliability, integrity, and ethics. (Bonczek 2011.) 
 
However, as Van Wart (1996) further notes, the numerous roles  and or value sets of 
administrators constitute the sources for the decisions they arrive at and this is one of 
the most generally agreed-upon perceptions in the field of public administration. For 
instance, an administrator may focus quite properly on organizational issues at one 
point, legal issues at another point, and personal interests on the other end still. 
However, many scholars have consciously separated the roles to cover all the most 
important decision-making bases. Following such a distinction, Dobel (1990) defines 
and identifies three roles of public administrators which include; personal responsibility, 
regime accountability, and prudence as the solutions to the ethical decision-making 
fusion. In the same vein,  Denhardt Kathryn (1991) distinguishes benevolence, justice 
and honor as the three "moral foundations," while Cooper (1990) categorizes four 
sources of ethical decision making which includes; individual attributes, organization 
structure and culture, societal expectations and individual attributes. On the other end, 
Warwick (1981) also identified and stated four sources which include personal interest, 
bureaucratic interest, constituency interest and public interest. 
 
Van Wart (1996: 526) further notes that, whereas the hitches of role identification and 
role description are mainly intellectual challenges, ethical decision making challenges 
for practitioners are severe when valid role functions compete. As indicated by 
empirical studies, "some of management's toughest dilemmas occur in trying to strike a 
balance between competing objectives". Research has further attests to the fact that, 
most managers and administrators in various occupations commit the same type of 
errors after considering or taking an ethical decision. Such errors are refer to as the 
decision trap. 
 
2.4.3. Decision traps 
 
Natale et al. (1995), define the decision trap as common errors made by administrators 
or managers after adopting an important decision. Such errors can be identified easily 
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with various sections of the decision making process. To this effect, Russo and 
Schoemaker (1990) put forward and elaborated the ten common errors which 
administrators and or managers repeatedly commit. These include; 
 
Immersion: generating a collection of information and arriving at conclusions without 
initially taking time off to think about the core of the issue that confronts a manager and 
or administrator or to think through the process of making such a decision; Structure 
blindness: attempting to select alternatives for the wrong problems because they have 
created a mental framework for their decision arbitrarily. Consequently, ignore the best 
option and lose sight of essential objectives; Lack of perspectives: the inability to define 
the problem adequately or getting diverted by the opinions of others; over reliance on 
your judgments: the inability to collect information because the decision maker is 
exaggeratedly confident of their own opinions and assumptions. 
 
 Imprudent shortcut: reliant on extraneous “rules of thumb” such as trusting the most 
readily available information without questions or basing conclusions on convenient 
facts only; Lack of organize procedures: neglecting to develop a methodical system to 
classify the information which has been revealed, thereby hindering the decision making 
process; Group/process deficiency:  entrusting too much confidence in the people 
involved and assuming that good decisions will be arrive at and therefore failing to 
manage the group decision process; Fooling yourself about feedback: inadequate 
interpretation of the result from prior decisions due to the fact that decision makers’ ego 
will not allowed them to believe that they have previously taking a bad decision; 
Insufficient analysis: reliant on experience alone and failing to uphold systematic record 
for analysis which will disclose the problems in the decision making process and; 
Neglecting to validate the decision process: the absence of an organization structure to 
audit the decision process thereby exposing the manager and or administrator to all the 
above mentioned traps. Natale  et al. (1995:7.) 
 
It is worthy to not that these decision  making traps are responsible to an extent for the 
inability of administrators and or managers to successfully implement government 
policies such as the case of the decentralization of forest resource management in 
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Cameroon where poorly administered policies based on poor decision making 
mechanisms have had serious effects on the local population. Thus, with the careful 
avoidance of such decision making traps, managers and or administrators can further 
initiate or develop a decision making process which will lead to improved decision 
making and better outcomes. 
 
2.4.4. Strategic decision making 
 
Decision making constitute the core of what managers and administrators do. It always 
requires more than an individual action and most especially when it has to do with 
major strategic matters; they execute the decisions as part of a social process involving 
many others that may become strained over an extensive period. Effective decision 
making is not something that is always successful in achieving what was envisioned, 
and what was intended is not always clear, but nonetheless strategic decisions are the 
core of successful organizations. Three types of strategic decision making process have 
been identified and include sporadic, fluid and constricted processes.  
 
A sporadic decision-making process is one that is informally intermittent and prolonged. 
A decision conceived in a sporadic manner is likely to run into more distracting delays, 
as a result of all sorts of obstacles that might range from having to wait for a report to 
resistance from the meeting. Also, some scope for negotiation would have taking place 
following a great deal of on and off informal contact and discussion. It would take even 
longer to get a decision, and the decision would eventually be made at the highest level.  
 
On the other end, Fluid decision making process is quite the reverse of sporadic process. 
Not too much informal activity is allowed along the corridors of decision in the 
administrative block or executive suite, despite the fact that it also creates room for 
negotiations just like the sporadic process. Most of the decisions in the fluid process are 
executed in a comparatively formal setting of meetings. More so, most of the discussion 
is transacted through pre-arranged working parties, project groups, boards, sub-
committees to name a few. Delays and impediments are thus less expected. Few sources 
of expertise are consulted, and there is a relatively unvarying degree of confidence in 
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their views and information and even though the decision is probably to be taken at a 
correspondingly high level, it will take a shorter time to arrive at the decisions say 
within months other than years.  
 
Conversely, constricted processes seem to share some of the delays encountered by the 
sporadic process even more than the fluids process does at any rate. Like the sporadic 
process, it draws its conclusion on several sources of information and views, and is not 
so focused on committees. However, the main difference between the constricted 
decision process and sporadic as well as fluids is that, it allows very minimal scope for 
negotiation pertaining to the decision, and the decision is made at a level lesser than the 
highest authority even though it is still high in the hierarchy considering that it is a 
strategic decision. The constricted process is however unique in the sense that, it tends 
to be more restrained and held in than any of the two types. While it draws on the views 
and information of relatively few external experts and departmental, what is required is 
readily accessible and requires no excessive effort to get it. More so, the organization 
does not undertake and special external investigations and there are no undue 
difficulties internally in merging and blending disparate material. The constricted 
process is further neither so informally active compared to what the sporadic processes 
tend to be, nor so formally active within meetings and committees as fluid processes 
tend to be. It completes with a decision that is arrived at without any requirement from 
the higher authorities or board, but then, the chief executive can still possibly make the 
decision without higher recourse. (Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory & Wilson 1989.) 
 
2.4.5. Decision making process 
 
According to Natale et al. (1995), a decision making process is thought of as, a series of 
stages that managers and administrators go through before arriving at a decision. As 
seen from the definition of decision making, one can quickly conclude that, it is 
relatively easy to make a decision since all its entails is choosing a course of action 
within alternatives. However, the decision making process is composed of some 
fundamental elements which every decision maker is compelled to go through either 
consciously or unconsciously. This serves as a justification to the reason why the 
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manner in which managers or administrators make decisions span from spontaneous to 
highly reason. The spontaneous approach is characterized by judgment, intuition and 
sometimes emotion while decision making based on the highly reasoned approach takes 
the form of a highly prescriptive decision or analytic approach because the approach is 
neat, orderly and structured. (Holloman 1989.) To this effect, the elements which 
characterize this highly reason or spontaneous decision making are further elaborated. 
They constitute the decision making process and include; 
 
Recognizing the problem and framing; first and foremost, the acknowledgement of the 
fact that a problem has risen is imperative for managers and or administrators. 
Consequently, the manager or administrator frames the question which pertains to the 
issue at stake; Defining the problem and marshalling data: secondly, there is need for 
managers to find out the clear facts and the slightest available information necessary to 
make the decision. Good decision makers deal with intelligent gatherings with 
premeditated effort because of its extreme significance to the process. (Russo & 
schoemaker, 1990.); Timing and the changing situation: thirdly, a sense of timing must 
be developed by managers on when to make a decision or not. For instance, an 
alternative that is chosen can be affected dramatically by the different modes people 
express (Mescon et al. 1988).  
 
Assuming too much: it is imperative for managers to be aware of and place proper 
emphasis on intuition particularly if it should contradict the indication of all the data 
(Fulmer, 1988).; Chosen alternatives: an orderly approach forces manager to scrutinize 
many aspects of the problem. It is obligatory for administrators to develop and assess 
alternative solutions to each problem (Russo & schoemaker 1990).; keeping the decision 
flexible: administrators must endeavor to avoid a close ended decision that is impossible 
to reverse or readjust. Modification is a necessity. Decisions occasionally need to be 
altered along the way. What is essential is flexibility of style and a promptness to 
change when suitable (Phillips, 1995.); Displaying guts: even though managers aspire to 
be supported by their peers’ fellow employees, it is imperative for them to select the 
best alternatives when making important decisions and not give in to pressure. It takes 
guts to stand alone. (Fulmer, 1988.) 
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Adopting the best alternatives: A logical and rational process usually results in selecting 
the best alternative. Conversely, managers must rely on instincts in the absence or 
unavailability of all the facts. The decision usually becomes more intuitive under 
conditions of uncertainty and risk. Nevertheless, both intuitive and analytical thought 
processes are imperative. But it is necessary occasionally and when need be to alter a 
more analytical approach and to take a “leap of faith.” (Holloman 1992.); implementing 
the decision: judgment is usually a ground work for action. Administrators who are 
scared of action increase the groundwork. Time is the core, as a result once a decision 
has been reached, implementation is indispensable (Huse 1979). and; Evaluating prior 
decisions; lastly, managers need to set up a system of learning from results of previous 
decisions. This scheme must incorporate tracking all related decisions that have been 
completed previously (Russo & Schoemaker 1990). 
 
Decision making for decades has been conceived largely as a selection from within 
alternatives with less focus on the manner in which it is constructed and executed. 
Nowadays, increasing recognition is ascribed to the decision making process by 
decision makers in order to anticipate the effects of choices made. In this respect, 
adopting and adapting the decision making process as elaborated above will lead to 
more effective decision making and future administrators and or managers will be better 
placed to adapt and adjust to societal dynamics by initiating decision making skills that 
can survive in an often unpredicted society. 
 
2.4.6. Decision making and the execution of decisions 
 
It is obvious that the employees at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy are 
those who execute the actual physical task of the organizations’ objectives. For instance, 
the field staff and not the mayor go to the field. The Mayor works by assigning specific 
tasks to subordinate units. Every organization or administrative unite is therefore 
composed of two set of people. These are; the supervisory employees and the operative 
employees. The supervisory employees (non-operative staff) take part in the 
accomplishment of the organization objectives by exerting control over the decisions of 
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the employees at the lowest level of administrative hierarchy. As elaborated by Simon 
(1997: 2), the influence of supervisory employees on operative employees may be direct 
though further interceded between the supervisors and operative employees in units of 
any size, numerous levels of intermediate supervisors who are themselves under the 
control of the supervisory employees but who convey, detailed and amend these 
influences before they are received by operative employees. 
 
Simon further notes that, the creation of a proficient administrative organization will 
remain a problem if one consider the above description of the administrative process as 
accurate because the description seems to him, a task of putting in place an operative 
staff and over imposing on those staff, a supervisory staff capable of controlling or 
influencing the operative group towards a model of coordinated and effective behavior. 
Furthermore, the phrase influencing rather than directing is used. To Simon, the creation 
of administrative organization takes more than just assignment of functions and 
allocation of authority. To him, operative employees must constitute the pivot of 
attention because the success of the structure will be assessed by their performance. 
Unfortunately, the reverse is true in reality. 
 
2.4.7. Facts, Value, Rationality and the Limit of Rationality in Decision 
 
Individuals’ behavior within administrative organization is purposive, geared towards 
goals or objectives. This purpose provides a basic criterion in determining ‘what things 
are to be done’ considering that administration consist of “getting things done” by 
groups of people. (Simon 1997:3.) Each decision has to do with the selection of goals 
and a behavior pertinent to it. These decisions are refer to as value judgments so long as 
they are geared towards the selection of ultimate goals and are as well refer to as factual 
judgments so long as they involve the implementation of such goals. The notion of 
purposiveness connotes the idea of hierarchy of decisions. Behavior is purposive so 
long as it is guided by common goals or objectives and it is rational so long as it 
chooses alternatives which are favorable to the achievement of the preceding selected 
goals. As such, good administration is behavior that is practically adapted to its end. 
However, rationality in decision has its limits especially as it holds that; 
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 Rationality requires a complete knowledge and expectation of the consequences 
that will follow on each choice when in essence; knowledge of consequences is 
always uneven. 
 It holds that; since the consequences lie in future, imagination must furnish the 
absence of experienced in attachment value to them. But value can only be 
imperfectly predictable. 
 Rationality requires a choice amid all likely alternative behaviours when in 
actual behaviour, only a very few of all these likely alternatives ever come to 
mind. (Simon 1997: 93-94.) 
 
2.4.8. Decision making in the administrative process 
 
As noted by Delmer (1998), administrative decision-making make up the most 
significant emphasis of administrative behavior. As one author notes, decision-making 
is the core of administration (Landau 1962). However, administrative activity is 
principally a group activity. In this respect, administrative processes are techniques 
which facilitate the development of processes for the application of organized effort to 
group task. Administrative processes are thus decisional processes and consist in 
splitting up a number of elements in the decision of members of the organization and 
setting up habitual organizational procedures to choose and resolve these elements and 
to transmit them to the members concerned. The administrative organization further 
takes some of the decisional autonomy from the individual and substitute for its 
organizational process of decisional making. 
 
Administrative organization decision making that pertains to individual simply state his 
or her functions by defining the nature and scope of his activities. It also allocates 
authority and decides on whom to have powers to make or influence decisions for the 
individuals within the organization. It further sets limits to these choices as are required 
to coordinate the duties of groups of individuals in the organization. As further 
elaborated by Gulick and Urwick (1937), the administrative organization is typified by 
specialization. Specific tasks are delegated to specific sections of the organization. It is 
worthy to note that, specializations takes the form of vertical division of labor and a 
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hierarchy or pyramid of authority can be set up with less or greater formality and the 
functions of decision making may be specialized among the members of this hierarchy. 
 
Based on the above ramification, the decision making process in administrative process 
is further divided into sub processes which include; setting the agenda, representing the 
problem, finding alternatives and selecting and evaluating alternatives (Langley et 
al.1995). However, as Simon (1997) further notes,  these division of the process of 
decision making into sub process have witness criticism from some authors who 
describe it falsely as a linear process and thereby rendering the process rigid. To Simon, 
there is no implication in this division and the sub processes must not follow an 
established order. Rather, agenda setting and resetting is an ongoing process that is 
subject to modification so long as there is need for the search for new decisions and 
alternatives as well as the selection of alternatives or a new occasion for new decisions 
come up. Moreover, a discovery of an alternative in one decision making process may 
find it effective usefulness and application in connection with a quite different decision 
in somewhat later time. As such, the administrative decision making process is not 
static. 
 
2.3.9 Decision making in Forest Resource Management Planning 
 
According to Knoke, et al. (2010), the development of forest management could be 
traced to the German speaking countries where forest management used to be a well-
developed and recognized discipline in forest science. However, such forest 
management has since gain prominence following the well-established and elaborated 
planning techniques and theoretical forest models. This increased development of forest 
management has since continued in the English speaking countries as demonstrated by 
high standards and up to date text books such as that of Davis et al. (2001), Bettinger et 
al. (2009) to name a few. 
 
As noted by Bettinger et al. (2009)  forest management planning is viewed as  a 
decision making process in which management activities are coordinated at the 
enterprise level of the forest over a medium to long term period. As they further note, 
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the development of a typical management plan is the end result of this process and 
embodies all activities that can be executed to meet the objectives of the land owners in 
the best possible way. 
 
Knoke and Weber (2006) further add that, the central objective of forest management 
planning centers around the integration of stakeholder’s interest and sustainability goals, 
a subject which further addresses social and ecological aspects in addition to economic 
objectives. In this regard, a forest management plan often follows numerous steps in 
order to effectively apply a typical decision making process. Such steps unfold with an 
outline of the management objectives, next by identification of management alternatives 
and lastly by selection of best or preferred approach. Nevertheless, the validity of the 
approach is only felt if there is the availability of adequate information regarding the 
condition of a specific management area, and also if anticipation with regards to the 
resource development under the distinguish management strategies are possible. (Knoke 
et al. 2010.) 
 
The values and preference of the decision maker determines the selection of the best 
planning alternative during the planning process. As such, there may be a distinct 
objective component in the decision making pertaining to forest resource management, 
reasons being that preferences and values vary amongst various institutions and persons 
and may thus show considerable variations. In a nut shell, the decision making stages 
for forest management planning could be summarized in the form of a circle where the 
monitoring and updating of the management plan feed back to the structure of goals, to 
the inventory concepts and to the formulation of management alternatives as shown 
below. 
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Figure 1. Decision making in Forest Management planning (Knoke et al. 2010: 772). 
 
 
As noted by Knoke et al. (2010:3), decision making in forest management planning is 
affected most by the degree of accuracy of information. Thus, accuracy of information 
is directly connected to the quality of decision making in forest management planning. 
As they further note, “the value of information is non consumptive by its nature” 
instead, information creates value because it provides the means for efficient decisions 
that meet the management objectives. Thus, the availability of excellent information and 
a sensible use of it might reduce the opportunity cost of making poor decisions. In this 
respect, most reviews have tended to associate the accuracy of information with the 
consequences of decisions which has gone a long way to make up a decision oriented 
approach in forest management planning. (Kangas 2010.) 
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2.3.10. Management in the context of forest resource 
 
Forest resource refers to “resources and values associated with forests. This includes 
timber, wildlife, recreation, botanical products, forage and biological diversity” (Forest 
Practices Code of British Columbia Act). Before now, forest was build to supply “high 
yield wood” but nowadays, the forest is no longer seen as “agglomeration of trees” 
conceived mainly in terms of its useful values, but instead as a “complex biological 
system with intrinsic value.” (Agnoletti & Anderson 2000: 47-48.) Decentralization of 
forest resources is argued to be necessary for equitable and inclusive development 
because forest resources serve as a source of local livelihood for the local population 
and also as a source of wealth to the government through revenue generated from tax 
fees and logging. (Ribot 2003: 54.) 
 
According to Agnoletti and Anderson, forest resource management is “organized 
production” and is one aspect of state administration to “transform all sort of activities 
left to habitat …..to a science”. The outcome is “the quantification and rationalization of 
nature and the regulation of economic practices.” (2000:48.) In this respect, forest 
resource management refers here to precautionary approaches taking to ensure efficient, 
effective and sustainable use of forests by different actors who have access and or 
control over it. This involves people, government and NGOs, planning, organizing, 
establishing rules and regulations governing forests, and respecting forest use norms 
based on their different interest and for purposes of sustainability. The importance of 
natural resource management varies according to different forest users or actors. 
Successful natural resource management would lead to “increased resource 
productivity, increased conservation and increased access to resource use by local 
people” (Raik & Decker 2007: 3). Raik and Decker claim that effective and efficient 
natural resource management has to take into account the linkages between sectors 
related to natural resources and interaction between people, nature, wealth and power as 
illustrated below; (2007:6.) 
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Table 2. An Analytical framework of successful natural resource management (Raik & 
Decker 2007:7). 
 
Analytical 
framework 
Community State forest agency Conservation –
oriented NGO 
 
 
People 
Use of forest products 
for medicinal plants, 
construction materials, 
firewood and food 
Educate local people 
about rules and policies 
governing legal forest 
use 
Ensure that people 
continue to value the 
forest and ensure its 
conservation 
 
 
Nature 
Conserve forest use and 
cultural values for 
future generations 
Conserve forest use 
value for renewable use 
by future generations 
Conserve forest 
biodiversity for future 
generation 
 
Wealth 
Receive financial 
benefit from the forest 
Exploit forest resources 
for the economic gain 
of the local people, e.g 
timber sales and 
agency, e.g timber 
permits 
Ensure that local people 
have the necessary 
resources so that 
pressure on forest is 
reduced 
 
 
Power 
Forest agents enforce 
the laws and keep 
illegal loggers out of the 
community forest areas, 
keep migrants from 
using local forest 
resources 
Ensure that the 
communities are 
adhering to the 
conditions set forth in 
contracts, ensure more 
efficient use of agency 
staff with respect to 
forest patrols and 
monitoring 
Ensure that the state 
forest agency prosecutes 
illegal forest users 
 
 
The promoters of decentralization and local democracy are interested in the 
management of natural resources and use because it serves as a “source of power and 
revenue and therefore potential legitimacy for new local government authorities” (Ribot 
2003:54). 
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2.5. Summary 
 
This chapter has been on the elaboration of central concepts, theory and a historical 
review on forest resource management in Cameroon. Major concepts such as forest 
resource management, decentralization, principles of administration and decision 
making have been defined and elaborated upon. The decision theory which constituted 
the framework of analysis in this study has also been reviewed and analyzed from 
different angles of administration and management but with main focused on decision 
making in forest resource management. Reviews have shown that the decision making 
process is always beautifully spelled out by decision makers in management plans. But 
the problem remains on whether such decisions are implemented as such or they just 
end up on paper. Secondly, most decision makers are caught in the decision making 
process by decision making traps making it difficult to achieve the expected results or 
meet the objectives. These have often led to severe consequences on the part of the 
beneficiaries and project or policy at stake and this is what this paper intends to examine 
in the case of the administration of the forest management decentralization policy in 
Cameroon. This review on the central theory will therefore, enable the researcher to 
analyze and compare theory and practice. In this respect, the implementation of forest 
management decentralization policy in Cameroon with respect to decision making is 
further outlined and analyzed in the subsequent chapter. But before we look into that, it 
is necessary to state the method and material used in this study. 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The earlier section has been on a detailed discussion of the theoretical concepts, with 
main focus on the theory of administration and decision making wherein, the principles 
of administration, the decision theory together with the decision making process and 
decision traps, as well as decision making in forest resource management planning 
amongst other sub topics have been reviewed and analyzed. The historical review of 
forest management in Cameroon has also been looked at. The proceeding section 
therefore outlines the procedures that will be used to carry out the entire research. 
 
 
3.2. The Research Process 
 
3.3. Qualitative research 
 
This study is mainly qualitative, based on a desk review and online interviews. Here, 
data are sorted and categorized to comprehend and describe situations and behaviors 
(Quimbe 2011). It consists of four phases. Phase one consists of survey of existing 
relevant literature such as journals and books with emphasis on the decision making 
process in forest resource management planning. As noted by Yang and Gerald (2008) 
books constitute an excellent source of information but they are generally more dated 
than journals. However, the greatest strength of books lie in the coverage it can provide 
over older subjects. In this study, both books and journals provide a qualitative sight 
and a broader understanding of the subject under study. As noted by Hutton (1990), a 
survey of such existing relevant literature is imperative to have a qualitative sight and to 
boost the understanding and level of knowledge of the research theme. In this regard, 
the review of literature in this study provides an excellent knowledge and understanding 
of the role of decision making in public administration as a whole and in the 
management and implementation of forest resource management. Moreover, the review 
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also points out certain factors that have an impact on the decision making process such 
as the decision traps which serve as a basis for a critical analysis in phase 3 of the study. 
 
 
3.4. Document analysis  
 
Survey of ministerial policy documents and decrees with regards to key policies in the 
area of forest management resource in Cameroon is very important in this study as it 
provides a lot of detail information with respect to public administration and the 
implementation and management of decision making within forest resource 
management in Cameroon. It therefore provides primary data which are very reliable 
and accurate. These documents also play a vital role in collecting data for the cases 
under study. Such ministerial documents which are used in this study include Cameroon 
Law No. 94/01 of January 20, 1994 on the Regime of Forestry, Wildlife and Fisheries 
and associate articles specifying the enforcement degrees in different areas. These law 
and associate articles are available online under the Cameroon ministry of Forestry and 
wildlife.  
 
Other documents used include certifications and articles bearing deliberations on the 
Dimako municipal council, partnership agreement between the municipality and the 
government, case studies on legal compliance on the forest sectors by municipalities 
and communities with forest, reports on seminar carried out on the functioning of 
community forest in Yaounde, as well as ministerial documents and decrees on the 
elaboration of forest management plans and procedures for implementation and 
exploitation of the forest. Other documents also include ministerial reports on the 
evaluation of forest resources as well as reports on transparency in the forest sector and 
the country’s forestry profile which can be found online. 
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3.5. Interviews 
 
As noted by Fontana and Prokos (2007), interviewing is one of the most easiest and 
powerful means in which we endeavor to comprehend our fellow humans. It includes a 
wide range of forms and array of uses. Most common forms involves individuals, and 
includes face to face verbal interviews, mail or self-administered close or open ended 
questionnaires, telephone surveys to name a few. They can be unstructured, semi 
structured or structured and it can be used for a wide variety of research and academic 
analysis as in the case of this study. 
 
According to Yin (1994), interview constitutes a very vital source of information in 
research. In this study, semi structured open ended questions were administered through 
telephone. The interviewees were mainly Phd students who were actively conducting 
field research in the same field of study in the field and an expert, the CEO of Erudef, a 
Non Governmentory Organization in charge of the protection of forestry and wildlife 
operating in the field. The open ended questions allow the respondents to freely air out 
their views and or share their perceptions on the issue at stake (Silverman 1993). It also 
allows the researcher to compare their responses to early research findings on the same 
subject as well as provide information on the current situation of decision making in 
forest resource management in Cameroon.  
 
However, it was not at all easy to carry out the interviews in this study as the strength of 
researcher to effectively carryout the interviews was somehow limited by financial 
constrains as she could not go to field to make a face to face interview. It was not also 
easy to find respondents who are willing to take part in the interview as the subject at 
stake was somehow a technical one and nobody wants to be caught for revealing some 
one’s identity or terming somebody as corrupt. More so, the inhabitants of these areas 
where the case studies are chosen are French speaking Muslims who are not very 
hospital and it requires translating the interviews to French language in order for them 
to understand. 
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Notwithstanding, I was somehow fortunate as it was easier for me identify and work 
with the head of an NGO that is operating on the same field and two PHD students who 
were also actively conducting field research in the same area. These were the only 
people I believe could give me genuine and unbiased information from the field. The 
interview was mainly through telephone conversation though it was somehow 
constantly    disrupted by poor network. 
 
The interview questions were as follows:  
1. What procedure is used to formulate a forest resource management committee 
within the council and the community? 
2. Who are the sole decision makers? 
3. How are proceeds from the forest managed or used? 
4. How often do they organize meetings to update and consult the local 
community? 
5. Are they accountable at all to the local community? 
The interviews were further used in the subsequent chapter to make a critically analysis 
of the issue at stake. 
 
 
3.6. Case Study 
 
Phase two is based on selected case studies. According to Stake (1995), case study 
remains one of the most commonly used and also the most excellent and well known 
approaches in qualitative research. He further notes that, it is very receptive to research 
questions of why and how, and provides the world of academia or the academic 
community with a flexible framework for investigating a holistic occurrence in its novel 
state. In the same vein, Yin (1994) further articulates that, a case study can also be 
qualified as a realistic investigation into an accessible event that happens or take place 
in actual life situations. It is in this respect that this research uses real life findings from 
intensive case studies of communities with councils and community forests in 
Cameroon. The case studies of Dimako and Kongo Council and Community Forest 
Eastern region are carefully chosen for this study because dimako as confirmed is the 
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most advanced council forest in Cameroon with a management plan that sets 70% of its 
area for logging. (Oyono 2004a.) 
 
 
3.7. The Dimako Council Forest  
 
 Dimako is a Sub Division in the upper Nyang Division of the Eastern region of 
Cameroon. It covers a surface area 36,384km. Dimako is the most advanced council 
forest in Cameroon with a management plan that sets 70% of its area for logging. This 
council serves as a source of inspiration for many types of councils. (Oyono 2004a.) 
However, the creation involves the following steps 
 
 
Table 3. Steps for the creation of a council forest case of Dimako (MINEF 1994; Oyono 
et al, 2007:5). 
 
The Creation of Dimako Council Forest 
Classification of the forest, for which local communities were consulted 
Drafting of a management plan, by a joint French-Cameroonian project, using socioeconomic data and 
forest inventories;  
Organizational arrangements, which led to the formation of the Consultative Management Committee, 
with a representative of each of the 17 villages that comprise  Dimako Rural Council as well as statutory 
members, and a Monitoring Committee 
legal and administrative procedures, including: 
approval of the management plan by the Ministry in charge of forests (formerly MINEF, now MINFOF)  
A Prime Ministerial Decree with regard to the official classification of the forest on behalf of the council 
in June 2001 
Official authorization, implying that exploitation of the forest could begin 
 
 
Although logging operations were meant to take off in 2003, it was until 2005 that 
effective logging began in the Dimako forest. It is estimated that the forest has 
generated up to CFA 72, 210, 000 francs till date. 
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3.8. Kongo Community Forest 
 
Kongo village community like the Dimako is found in Upper Nyong division of the 
East region of Cameroon. It constitutes part of the Dja forest, found in the ever green 
forest of Cameroon-Congolese. Kongo is endowed with a high level of biodiversity and 
has above 1600 species of trees of high commercial value. Kongo has a population of 
about 500 inhabitants. The forest ecosystem is also known for its rich floristic 
potentials. The Kongo’s community forest occupies 3,000hectars. It was created 
officially in 2000 with the endorsement of the management agreement between the 
village community and the ministry of environment and forestry.  
 
“The ceremony presided by Lazare Mpouel Bala, Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests, was the culmination of several years’ work and a long process 
patiently led by the SNV/SDDL project, with the support of the Community Forestry Unit 
(MINEF), in the villages of Kongo, Eshiembor/Malen, Koungoulou, Ngola, and Moangé-Le-
Bosquet. […] SDDL’s work was fundamental to a number of village communities finally 
becoming the direct managers of 16,532 hectares of their own forests [….] Although many 
questions have still not been answered, particularly those concerning the way in which 
resources are actually exploited and the revenue from them judiciously allocated, it can be said 
that the five village communities have taken an important step [….] Euphoria reigns in Lomié, 
as the five villages plan their future, sometimes with hope bordering on utopia. Each has its own 
priorities: habitat improvement, construction of roads or schools, the production of new food or 
cash crops [….] however, just knowing that they will no longer be mere passive spectators of the 
exploitation of the forest’s resources by outsiders, and unscrupulous outsiders at that, is an 
undeniable psychological plus and represents a considerable achievement.” (Nchoankwi 
2000:20.) 
 
Many expectations were raised in the local community by the establishment of 
community forest as they saw this as an opportunity for “making a living from the 
forest”. However, as it was prescribed by the legal procedures and methodological 
instrument that a legally recognized management body known as “the manager” should 
be created to oversee the smooth running of the community forest, the Kongo 
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community forest management committee (KOBANKO) was mandated in 1997 with 
the guidance of the procedure manual. It emerged as a GIC in 1997 and by 1998; it was 
uplifted to the status of an association. While this period could be seen as a critical 
moment in relation to “organizational and institutional arrangements” for local 
governance of the community forest, the creation of KOBANKO brought several 
changes which were very significant. The local population was already well informed of 
the meaning of “community forest”, the “policy reasoning behind it” (more 
responsibilities to be transferred to the local population and improving on their 
wellbeing by redressing their aged old demand and socioeconomic injustices), and the 
role of local governance, through the information and awareness campaign that was 
organized for them. (MINEF 2001.) 
 
The primary motive of this section has been to develop an empirical design in order to 
tackle the research problem. In this respect, the section started with a review on the 
process of the research and tools which had to do with survey of literature, case study, 
interviews and survey of ministerial documents and decrees. These tools provide the 
researcher with adequate information that is used in providing answers to the research 
questions 
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4. FINDINGS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The procedures used in conducting this research have been provided in the previous 
chapter. Emphasis is placed on tools used to carry out the research and the research 
process in general. This chapter therefore presents the results and findings with an effort 
to analyze them. The chapter focuses on providing answers to the objectives and 
research question which was to examine why decision making in decentralized forest 
resource management has failed to achieve desired results of sustainable forest resource 
management and local development in the Dimako Council and Kongo Community 
Forests and also to find out the possible implications and outcomes of the failure of the 
implementation of these managerial decisions on the development of the local 
community and country as whole. Information on the case studies in the previous 
chapter therefore give the researcher the opportunity to triangulate with the reviews in 
Chapter two in order to provide sufficient information on the set back of this policy 
reform. The chapter further presents the findings based on the literature, cases under 
study and interviews. 
 
The objectives of this chapter are therefore to: 
 Identify and analyse reasons that justify the failure of the implementation of 
decision making functions in the cases under study in the light of the reviews in 
chapter two  
 Identify and analyse local level outcomes of the process 
 
 
 4.2. The management committee of Dimako forest 
 
As noted by Oyono (2004), deliberation No 01/D/CR/DKO of the Dimako Municipal 
Council, a decentralized assembly which represents the localities of Dimako Municipal 
Council led to the creation of Dimako Council Forest Management Consultative 
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Committee. This committee is made up of 17 members, selected by the 17 communities 
that make up the council along with “Statutory” members selected and recruited by 
municipal authorities and state administration (Durrieu de Madron et al. 1998). 
Membership into the Dimako council forest management consultative committee takes 
different modes of representation.  
 
The first of which is competitive elections which Overdevest (2000) and Ribot (2001) 
describe as generally the most efficient and effective means of achieving representative 
decision making and democracy. This elective mechanism seems to function to a greater 
extent in a transparent manner in the Dimako Council under expert’s supervision from 
the Forets et Terroirs Project (Asembe 200). This mechanism is clearly noted in this 
committee as members are made up of elective representatives from each of the 17 
communities of the Dimako Council.  
 
Appointment of members by a consensus is also another form of representation in the 
Dimako forest management committee as noted by Oyono (2004) and confirmed by 
Ofoulhast-Othamot, (2011). In all six communities, a member was appointed to the 
Dimako Council Management Consultative Committee by consensus, chosen from 
individuals who volunteered to be the village representatives. According to the locals, 
these are individuals who owing to their integrity and status are fit or able to negotiate 
alliances that eventually result in consensus. Statutory appointments also constitute 
another form of representations. This is usually based on appointments where members 
are selected and appointed following their existing status and in accordance with the 
necessary legal provisions. This is the situation in the Dimako council forest 
management committee where 9 non community members and 17 community 
representatives became members by virtue of statutory appointments. As Assembe 
(2000)  and Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011) note on the quality of members of this 
committee, the Mayor is automatically the president and head of the committee, the 
representative of the Forets et Terroirs Project is the councilor,  other members are 
leaders of each commission of  the municipal council and elected representatives of 
each community. 
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Self-appointment is also another mode of representation in which persons such as 
notables, village chiefs and the elites nominate themselves as members of a committee. 
As Oyono further notes, a chief of a community in the Dimako district admits to have 
appointed members of the Forestry fees management committees without the 
knowledge of the community and there is no specification on the duration and time limit 
of these committees. Vertical co-option also constitutes another mode of representation 
where a chief of a community already self appointed as a member, still co-opt his 
supporters, dependents and individuals who as members are answerable to him. This is 
common and visible in the establishment of forestry fees management committees as 
seen in the case of five communities in the Dimako district. It is necessary in this study 
to elaborate on these different modes of representation because as reviews articulate, 
these different modes of representation constitute the basis of mismanagement of 
decision making functions in forest resource management planning in Cameroon. 
 
4.2.1. Objectives of the management committee of the Dimako forest 
 
The Committee members have as objectives the power and discretion to; 
“(a) take part in all of the operations arising from the organization of this forest and its 
profit to the Council; (b) to recommend to the Municipal Council any suggestions 
toward a healthy, transparent, profitable, and sustainable management of said forest; (c) 
to put forward to the Municipal Council a balanced plan for the utilization of the income 
through cautious selection of projects on a village-by-village basis”. The goal of the 
Committee is to administer the Council forest. This Committee does not act as a 
replacement for the Municipal Council; rather, it helps the Municipal Council in 
developing issues that require decision making. It thus, serves as mediator between the 
populations and the Municipal Council as well as the forestry administration. It 
ascertains representation of the villages. It formulates and generates questions on the 
operation of forestry in the Forest. At least on paper, every decisions (of the Committee) 
are only propositions that are then tabled to the Municipal Council; who can then ratify, 
modify or discard them” ( Deliberation No. 01/D/CR/DKO of the Dimako Municipal 
Council). 
 
49 
 
 
4.2.2. Decision making powers of the local management committee of Dimako Council 
 
The responsibilities and decision making powers of these committees are defined by 
legal instruments and administrative orders as well as by mandate handed to the 
committee by the local communities they represent. These decision making powers are 
stipulated by law No 94/01 of 20 January 1994 and its 1995 enforcement decree. Per 
this law, it is obligatory for all councils and communities wishing to have access and 
decision making powers over management of forest and its proceeds, to hold a 
consultative meeting that includes all mechanisms of the community geared towards 
selecting and appointing the local body which will be charged with the responsibility to 
manage the said forest, sets it objectives and define it boundaries. As such, a great deal 
of decision making power has been devolved to the body in charge of managing council 
and community forest as the law places the committee in a point of liaison with all 
external actors. Moreover, the limit of the scope of these responsibilities is not 
specified. However, two major decision making functions were transferred from the 
central state and administrative arena. These include that of the interface between the 
external actors and the population and of monitoring the establishment and 
implementation of management plan. (Oyono 2004.) 
 
Deliberations and analysis of the effects of different modes of representation in the 
management committee and the nature and power of this committee will be presented in 
the proceeding sections after presenting the case of Kongo Community Forest. 
 
 
4.3. The Kongo Local Community Management Committee 
 
Two preconditions were required for COBANKO to become a management body; the 
creation of an institutional and executive bureau. The role of the executive bureau was 
to “implement and regulate” decision making in community forest management. The 
executive board comprised of a chairman and four appointed (not elected) 
representatives of the four lineages. The constitution of board of directors was followed 
by the organization of a consultative meeting during which all internal and external 
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actors/stakeholders established a unanimous agreement over forests management. This 
was followed by drafting of a simple management plan which outlines the management 
of the local community forest, logging plans and micro projects to be executed with 
revenue accruing from forest (socioeconomic directives of the community). This 
process was finalized on August 10, 2000, when the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry endorsed their management agreement 
 
The executive bureau of COBANKO and its regulations constitute a major department 
in the organizational framework and institutional arrangements of governance at the 
local level. With the application of the 1994 Forestry Law, “global powers” were cedes 
to community forest managers to “represent the local communities”.  
 
4.3.1. Objectives of the Kongo local community management committee 
 
By virtue of the devolved powers vested on the community management committee, 
COBANKO was charged with the responsibilities of taking decisions on the 
management of income accruing from forest; following up of the implementation of the 
Simple management Plan, negotiating with external actors, for the purpose of ensuring 
socioeconomic development. It is important to note that, no internal rules or regulations, 
structure, collective code of law, was established with regards to the management of the 
revenue generated from forest or biophysical management. Rules were less rigid and not 
explicitly spelled out. No sanctions were put in place for the mismanagement of funds 
and no framework was established for collective actions regarding expected income 
generated from the forest and forest management. Moreover, the Annual General 
Assembly of COBANKO meant to access and evaluates forest management and 
expected revenue has never taken place.  Enyegue (2003a: 6-7) describes the 
COBANKO structure and objectives as follows; 
 
“COBANKO consists of three bodies. Firstly, there is the general assembly, which is supposed 
to be held once a year. It should: (i) establish, in general, the way in which the association is 
run; (ii) evaluate the management plans and the reports of the executive bureau members; (iii) 
elect the members of the executive bureau; (iv) approve […] the administrative structure as well 
as the budget; and (v) draft and modify the association’s basic documents. The general assembly 
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consists of the founding members (of the association), the executive bureau, the associate 
members, and all the able-bodied members of the community. Secondly, there is the executive 
bureau, which consists of the chairman, the deputy chairman, a general secretary responsible 
for forest operations, a deputy general secretary, and the auditor. Finally, there is a conflict 
resolution commission, the structure and operation of which have not been clearly established” 
(Enyegue (2003a: 6-7.) 
 
4.3.2. Decision making powers of the Kongo local community forest management 
committee. 
 
For the purpose of further discussions in this paper, it is also important to outline the 
procedures of the “devolved attribute and powers” adapted in local governance unites 
(Government decision making representative entities, the rural council, the community 
management body) for the management of the community forest. Several parameters 
were taken into consideration and include;  (a)“whether the management committees 
fulfill their duties; (b) the objective and subjective alliances between the management 
committees and      outsiders, on the one hand, and the structural relationship between 
the management committees and the rest of their village communities on the other; (c) 
the functional and morphological changes undergone by the management committees; 
and (d) the committees’ accountability to the rest of the village”. A description of these 
parameters is an indication of the local level outcome of devolution and local 
democracy”. However, before we go into analysis and local level outcomes of the 
implementation of decision making in decentralized forest resource management 
planning in Cameroon, it is important to have an overview of the root of public 
administration in Cameroon and its operational mechanism in the light of decentralized 
forest resource management. (Oyono et al. 2006: 33-40.) 
 
 
4.4. Decentralization as a major policy reform in forest resource management in 
Cameroon 
 
As noted by Oyono (2004:5), decentralization in the Cameroon context refers to “all 
that is passed from the administrative monolith to diverse managers once territorial 
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unity is achieved”. That said, three levels of decentralization are dealt with in this study. 
These include; the central, regional and local level. As noted by Mawhood (1993:19) 
and Huang (1996:655-659), the central level here refers to the organizing centralizing 
State, while the “local” level refers to local communities. We also have a regional level, 
which has an important role to play in this study especially in the area of decision 
making. It works and collaborates with State representatives, sub-national authorities 
and council authorities. It thus serves as the connection between the central state and the 
local bodies.  
 
The decentralization of forest management in Cameroon is built upon three essential 
values which include; 
 
 “the potential for villages to create and manage community, or village, forests; 
 the potential for local governments, more specifically councils, to constitute and manage council 
forests; and 
 the potential for village communities situated within or bordering logging sites which they have 
traditional rights, to have access to the profits generated from the forest through a decentralized 
forestry taxation system.” (Oyono 2004:10.) 
 
4.4.1 Structure of the Cameroon’s Decentralized Forest Resource Management  
 
The 1994 forestry law provides for forestry, wild life regulations amongst others. Modes 
of implementations of these regulations were outlined in detail by decree (RoC 1995). 
These varieties of articles, circulars and orders constitute the legal bases for the 
decentralization of the forest resource management in Cameroon which has as objective 
to; 
 “Promote community participation in forest management (local democracy); 
 Contribute to poverty reduction; 
 Contribute to sustainable forest resource management.” (Forestry law 1994; Oyono et al. 
2007:3.) 
The 1994 forestry reform further established four basic mechanisms which constitute 
the foundation of decentralized forest resource management in Cameroon. These 
mechanisms include; 
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Council forest 
 
Council forest was the first innovation brought by the new forest policy reform in 1994. 
Council forest is defined here as “any forest that has been classified and assigned to a 
council concerned or that was planted by the council on council land.” (RoC 1994.) The 
boundaries of the designated forest and its management objectives are established by the 
operation of this classification (Oyono 2004a; Oyono et al. 2007). By the application 
decree of the 1994 forestry law, ownership rights over biophysical units within a 
jurisdiction were transferred to the council. Moreover, ownership rights over the 
financial benefits generated from the exploitation of timber and other forest products 
were transferred to the council. (RoC 1994; 1995.) As of today, only five council forests 
have been established and classified in accordance to the law as “council forest”. These 
councils include, the Dimako, Moloundou and yakadouma Rural Councils in the East 
region and the Djoum and Sangmelima Rural Councils in the South region. Among 
these councils, the Dimako council forest is the most advanced council forest (Oyono et 
al. 2007). 
 
 The community Forest 
 
The 1994 forestry law also allows the possibility of village communities to establish 
community forest. This principle was applied by Forestry Law No 94/01 of January 20, 
1994. A community forest is defined according to Article 3 of this implementation 
decree which was promulgated in 1995 as “a forest of the non-forest permanent estate, 
subject to a management agreement between a village community and the 
administration in charge of the forests. The management of such a forest is the 
responsibility of the village community concerned, with the help or technical assistance 
of the forestry administration”. The boundaries of the community forest are only set 
over land which the community concerned has customary rights. On the other hand, the 
1994 forestry law further requires the community members wishing to establish a 
community forest to provide a “simple management plan” in order to have legal 
recognition. This management plan serves as a contract through which the ministry of 
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forestry “cedes a plot of the national estate to the village community, for its 
management, conservation and logging.” (Ministry of Environment and Forests 1999; 
Oyono et al. 2006:30.)  
 
The community members are further requested to organize themselves to “legal 
entities” represented by groups of individuals operating with a legal status of an 
economic interest group, association, common initiative group, cooperatives or non-
governmental organization. The mandate to exercise powers transferred to village 
communities over the community forest and the financial benefit accruing from it is 
then handed to the “manager” which is the local entity.  
 
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry also developed a manual of “norms and 
procedures” (a technical tool) for the establishment of community forest. These 
technical tools together with other circulars outline the methodology and approach for 
the establishment of the community forest (Bureau Veritas Certification 2006). 
Conclusions have been made from several studies that a significant contribution to 
wellbeing and sustainability can be made from community forest management. It is to 
this effect that the Minister of Environment and Forestry, through the right of pre-
emption, under Circular Letter No 518/MINEF/CAB (December 21, 2001), established 
“priority attribution of any forest likely to be established as a community forest to the 
neighboring village community”. This was aimed at given priority to village 
communities over logging companies, when there may be an allocation of forest on 
auction sales.  
 
Hence priority is given to village community petitions and the forest unit in concern 
becomes the community forest.  This was supposed to be an incentive to enforce the 
village community’s power over “their” forest while encouraging the creation of 
community forests. (Oyono. et al. 2006:30; Oyono et al. 2007.) These are very good 
policies that are however not implemented in practice as shown below in the Manual of 
Norms and procedures for the attribution and management of the community forest 
which states that, for a community forest to be established, public awareness and 
information campaign should be created at the level of the village community that 
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wishes to apply for a forest; followed by creation of a management entity; marking out 
of the future community forest description of the community forest; establishment of a 
simple management plan; agreement and endorsement of the simple management plan 
by the services of MINFOF and ratification of the management agreement between the 
village community concerned and MINFOF. (Oyono et. al. 2007:5.) 
 
 Parafiscal Community Compensation Mechanism 
 
The village tax and the establishment of socioeconomic amenities to the benefit of the 
neighboring communities was the second major instrument of the decentralized forestry 
taxation system. In accordance to Circular Letter No 370/LC/MINEF/CAB), logging 
companies were obliged to pay FCA 1000 (US $1.5). This tax which ought to be paid 
regularly was established by regulations and not included in the finance bill. To further 
guarantee the effective management of this tax when it was actually paid, new 
associations were established and village development committees were reactivated. 
These associations and committee members were elected to serve as representatives of 
the village communities in all transactions that had to do with finance; deciding on what 
amount the logging companies will pay, overseeing the implementation of cash 
registers, making negotiations with entrepreneurs charged with the construction of the 
agreed-upon socioeconomic infrastructure. (Oyono et al. 2006:31.) 
 
Annual Forest Fees 
 
One of the major provisions of the 1994 Forestry Law is the Annual Forest Fees, though 
it was only until 1996/1997 that it was implemented. With respect to the annual forest 
fees, the law states that, “for the development of village communities neighboring the 
national forest estate, part of the revenue from the sale of the forest product shall be 
transferred to the local communities according to the mechanism implementing decree” 
(unofficial translation). This law also provides for the distribution of forests fees which 
was collected annually as follows; 50% to the state, 40% to the management unit/rural 
council within the forest community and 10% to the neighboring village. The creation 
of regional committees or commission for the management of forest fees within each 
56 
 
 
rural council was also a requirement of the joint ministerial order. In accordance to this 
order, the village committees were obliged to represent the communities at the regional 
level/commission within each rural. Regional commission meetings were presided over 
by the sub divisional officer or mayor while members were made up of village 
committees. The priorities for socioeconomic development in each village were then 
established by the commission and village representatives (committee members) after 
which, a company was contracted for the implementation of the community project. 
(Oyono et al. 2006:32; Oyono 2004a.) 
 
 
4.5. Decision making in administration and decentralization of forest resource 
management in Cameroon 
 
As stated by Natale et al. (1995), a decision is a selection between two alternatives. 
Such courses of action are chosen by administrators and or managers not for themselves 
but for the administration and entire public. Those at the top of the administration may 
take decisions or make managerial decisions which have a strong impact not only on 
everyone who works with that administration but the entire public. The primary motive 
of making any decision is to set up and achieve administrative objectives and goals. 
Decision making in this study is comprised of two categories. These include decisions 
that are common to the managers such as scheduling, recruitment, selection and firing, 
and uncommon decisions which are taking by public administrators as well as managers 
on a less frequent basis and have long term effect on the entire population. They may 
include; changes in strategies such as the case of decentralization policy, allocation of 
resources to name a few. It is worthy to note that, administration is a continuous 
process, an ongoing entity and as such, decisions made today might have severe 
consequences in future 
 
In Cameroon, decision making connections are initiated by the president of the republic 
whose political power base is build and consolidated by establishing or putting in place 
bureaucratic agencies made up of people who share common interest with him. As 
noted by Mongo (2008), the president achieves this objective through a careful selection 
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and appointment of ministers, regional governors as well as divisional authorities and 
director of agencies. This entails that, the president is the sole decision maker in 
Cameroon. 
 
However, decision making took a new dimension prior to the 1994 Forestry Law which 
came with the introduction of decentralized forest management. Decentralization of 
forest management in principle here refers to the redistribution and transfer of decision 
making powers and rights over resources and management of forest from the central to 
the local authorities who are representatives of and responsible to the local 
communities. It was hoped that, this would led to redistribution of decision making 
functions, promotion of downward accountability, democracy through the provision of 
arenas for the local communities to participate in decision making of forest management 
in which they constitute a part (Oyono 2007). It was also meant to empower the local 
communities by granting access to and control of proceeds accruing from forest. 
 
In this regard, the sole decision makers in the case of the municipal forest in principle 
are electoral Mayors and Councilors, while at the community level, the management 
community, made up of elected and appointed individuals are in charge of all decisions 
with regards to forest management at that level. In principle, these representatives ought 
to execute their activities and remain accountable to the local population. The policy 
was thus formulated at least on paper on the bases of non-hierarchical model where the 
municipalities and local management committees are left with the responsibility to take 
decisions in the management of their forest. 
 
However, as noted by Oyono (2004), the relationship between the state and central level 
in the case of decentralization as a whole in practice in Cameroon does not follow this 
non-hierarchical model of decision making. In practice the relationship is that of upward 
accountability as opposed to downward accountability which is stipulated by the 
decentralization policy per say. This is also confirmed by Nkembi Louis; Ndeloh Denis 
and Mbunya Francis (2013). 
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 As noted in the reviews and confirmed by nkembi et al. (2013), the local government in 
Cameroon  is headed and supervised by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and 
central government service in addition to regional governors, divisional and district 
officers. This entails that at the level of the region, the Mayor of the municipality who is 
an elected representative of the people in principle, reports and take orders from the 
divisional and district officers who are representatives of the central government, 
appointed by a presidential decree. As such, these central government representatives do 
not feel accountable or answerable to the Mayors, worse so to the local population and 
or community. (Bigombe 2003; Nkembi 2013.) 
 
Oyono (2004) and Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011) describe this wholly upward 
accountability as an attempt or an indicator by the central government to resist the 
process of decentralization of decision making process which is meant to give power to 
the local government. They also describe the situation as an example of the reproduction 
of the relationship of submission. To them, there is need to focus more attention on the 
representatives of the central government at the local level as they are likely to hijack 
the decision making process and claim their right of control over local authorities from 
the income accruing from the council forest to the disadvantage of the local 
communities, a situation which Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011) describes as, an attempt by 
the mayor to establish himself as the “bigman”. As Oyono further notes, such resistance 
to the decentralization of decision making process ‘at the top’ is common in the forestry 
taxation system which is the most productive area. This is an indication that decision 
making in the administration and decentralization of forest resource management in 
Cameroon is not only caught by the decision making trap but also by egocentric motives 
and mismanagement of decision making functions. 
 
4.5.1. Decision making traps in administration and decentralization of forest resource 
management in Cameroon. 
 
Natale et al. (1995), define the decision trap as common errors made by administrators 
or managers after adopting an important decision. Such errors can be identified easily 
with various sections of the decision making process. In this respect, decision making in 
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administration and decentralization of forest management in this study is not an 
exception. As seen in the reviews above, the decision making process already have 
some setbacks which include the fact that; 
 
A) Decision making in administration and decentralization of forest resource 
management in this case, suffers from group/process deficiency whereby, too 
much confidence have been entrusted in the people involved as it assumed that 
good decisions will be arrive at and therefore fails to manage the group decision 
process. This accounts for the upward accountability as opposed to downward 
accountability that is stipulated in the decentralization policy in this case and 
also serves as a justification to why central government representatives do not 
feel accountable to the Mayor, worse so, to the local population. 
 
B) Decision making in this case also fails to produce the necessary outcome 
because the local authorities and representatives of the local population such as 
the Mayor, Councillors and local management committees as well as the local 
population deceive themselves about feedback due to inadequate interpretation 
of the result from prior decisions and the fact that decision makers’ ego and 
greed will not allowed them to believe that they have previously taking a bad 
decision. 
 
C) Decision making in this case has also been trapped because the authorities in 
charge and the local population as a whole neglect to validate the decision 
process. This is often due to the absence of an organization structure to audit the 
decision process thereby exposing the manager and or administrator to all sorts 
of traps. (Samuel et al (1995:7.) 
 
4.5.2. Decision making and the execution of decisions  
 
As earlier stated, it is obvious that the employees at the lowest level of the 
administrative hierarchy are those who execute the actual physical task of the 
organizations’ objectives. For instance, the field staff and not the mayor go to the field. 
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The Mayor works by assigning specific tasks to subordinate units. Every organization or 
administrative unit is therefore composed of two set of people. These are; the 
supervisory employees and the operative employees. The supervisory employees (non-
operative staff) take part in the accomplishment of the organization objectives by 
exerting control over the decisions of the employees at the lowest level of 
administrative hierarchy 
 
In the same vein, and in accordance with the guide lines of the decentralization of forest 
management in Cameroon, the Mayor works by assigning specific task to subordinate 
units based on the decisions arrived at by the municipal councilors and approved by the 
central state representative at the local level. In the case of community forest, the 
community forest management committee is charged with the responsibilities of 
implementing the decisions arrived at by the general community.  
 
 
4.6. Decision making in forest resource management planning in Cameroon 
 
As reviewed earlier, Bettinger et al. (2009) note that  forest management planning is 
viewed as  a decision making process in which management activities are coordinated at 
the enterprise level of the forest over a medium to long term period. As they further 
note, the development of a typical management plan is the end result of this process and 
embodies all activities that can be executed to meet the objectives of the land owners in 
the best possible way. 
 
Knoke and Weber (2006) further add that, the central objective of forest management 
planning centers around the integration of stakeholder’s interest and sustainability goals, 
a subject which further addresses social and ecological aspects in addition to economic 
objectives. In this regard, a forest management plan often follows numerous steps in 
order to effectively apply a typical decision making process. Such steps unfold with an 
outline of the management objectives, next by identification of management alternatives 
and lastly by selection of best or preferred approach. 
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In this regard, decision making in forest resource management in Cameroon is not an 
exception as it seems to be in line with the reviews of theory. First of all, it is worthy to 
note that decision making in forest resource management planning in Cameroon is a 
complex process that involves numerous stakeholders with conflicting interest but for 
the purpose of the subject under study in this case, decision making in forest resource 
management in Cameroon will be limited to the cases of municipal and community 
forest. (European Commission 2007) That said, the 1994 law gave local communities in 
Cameroon access rights and decision making over the management of forest resources 
around or in their municipalities based on a signed management agreement by the 
community concerned and the State. It also includes a simple management plan “a 
management agreement in a contract by virtue of which the services in charge of the 
services allots to a community, a portion of the national forest estate which the 
community manages, preserves and exploit in its own interest” ( Article 3(16) of Decree 
No. 95/53//PM of 23rd August 1995). As such, local communities can per this 
agreement, take decisions on the management and exploitation of forest resources in a 
participatory manner thereby enhancing livelihood development. 
 
In this respect, implementing decision making in the management planning of forest 
resources follows a series of steps as seen above. In the Cameroon case, this include; a) 
taking a decision to reserve a community and or council forest area, b) allocating the 
forest to the council or community following the preparation of the simple management 
plan, c) exploiting the forest resource sustainably to the advantage or benefit of the 
community, d) a technical phase which has to do with decisions on the selection and 
sustainable logging of forest resources and e) organization which entails accurate and 
impartial management of large sums of money as contained in the institutional 
framework. (Cuny, Ango & Ondoa 2009.)  
 
In principle, a simple management plan involves six stages which include; the 
information and planning meeting where the objectives and goals are set, the training of 
councilors/villagers for data collection, data collection (socio economic surveys, 
delineation of the forest, forest inventories etc, data processing, training of 
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councilors/villagers on how to draw up the simple management plan and finalizing the 
management plan. (Cuny et al. 2009.) 
 
Based on this, implementations of generally agreed decisions are executed solely by 
elected and appointed local community forest management committee members. The 
council and local community henceforth has as rights to exercise decisions over a) the 
exploitation of council and community forests respectively, b) the exploitation of all of 
the forestry water-based and fauna including products from the entire private forests, c) 
decisions over the use of income from the exploitation of forestry resources, d) 
Conservation of resources and d) exploitation of forestry resources (see Articles 7, 16 
and 17 of Law No. 94/01; Articles 8, 26(1), 30(2), 36 and 86 of Law No. 94/01;  Article 
68(2),(3) of Law No. 94/1 and article 85 from the Enforcement Decree; Article 7 from 
the Enforcement Decree; & Articles 6, 18 and 20 (1) from the Enforcement Decree). 
Prior to community based forest management, Cameroon has since endorsed 41 council 
forests covering about 1million hectare and managed by councils. In the same vein, it 
has also endorsed 178 community forests with accepted management plans for a total of 
636752 ha. (Cuny et al. 2009.)  
 
 
4.7. Local level out comes and analysis 
 
The general objective of this study has been to examine to examine why the 
implementation of decision making in decentralized forest resource management has 
failed to achieve the objectives of sustainable forest resource management and local 
development in the Dimako Council and Kongo Community Forests and also to find out 
the possible implications and outcomes of the failure of the implementation of these 
managerial decisions on sustainable forest management and the development of the 
local community and country as whole. Specifically, the study looks at the 
implementation process of the decentralized forest management policy by examining 
the administrative process of the implementation of this policy in the light of the 
administrative behavior of the administrators and with focus on the execution of 
decision making functions. 
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Findings suggest that, the decentralization of forest management in Cameroon is finally 
an interrupted process, obstructed halfway by regional level forces who are considered 
as mid-level actors and by local community chiefs (Nkembi 2013). The failure of the 
central state to set up regulation mechanisms and a way to evaluate or keep an eye on 
the process has paved way for the decentralization of forest management resources to be 
captured by mid-level actors operating in a chain of net-works with their sole interest 
based on financial gains. (MINFOF 2007.) As Oyono (2004:3) further note, this transfer 
of powers from the center only gave room for the division of forest administration and 
the establishment of legal “gangsterism” in an arena where abuse of power as a result of 
mismanagement of decision making functions and corruption was already deeply 
rooted. This view is also supported by Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011) who notes that the 
Mayor of Dimako, has taking advantage of the new opportunities offered by the forestry 
law to capture the council forest and utilize it for power-building purposes, thereby 
earning himself the status of a “Big Man”. However, as the findings from reviews and 
interviews suggest, many factors account for the failure of the new reform to achieve 
desired results. These include; 
 
4.7.1. Limited transfer of decision making functions to the committees and tendencies 
of centralization  
 
As Oyono and Nkembi (2013) further note, even though a great deal of decision making 
power seems to be transferred at least on paper to the local management committees, in 
practice no real power has been devolved to the local management committees except 
that which compels them to serve as representatives of their various local communities.  
Oyono et al. (2002a) further articulate that, these local committees face stiff competition 
with customary local authorities where as in other communities; these communities do 
not have any sense of organizational management and have not been able to set up an 
organizational base. As such, the decision making powers of the local management 
committees which seem to have been devolved from above are still held by the central 
state and administrative authorities. In this respect, the decision making powers of the 
committees are very limited as these powers are defined by the Municipal Order that 
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established them. The committee is thus only seen as an extension of the council given 
that it cohabits with the Municipal Council which generally has its own representational 
mandate (IFIA 2006). 
 
Moreover, local level forest and forestry fees management committees do not operate 
independently. All local management committees are headed by a “regional committee” 
“a committee above committees” (Oyono 2004:21; Nkembi 2013). In essence, Articles 
4 and 7 of the Order stipulates that the administrative authority supervises the said 
“committee above committees” and the committee requires a certifying officer who is in 
charge of expenses and a controller in order to accomplish its missions. In this regard, 
the local committees are thus supervised and managed by three external forces that 
operate in a kind of an executive committee or network. These forces are; the senior or 
divisional officer himself who presides over the committee and serves as the president, 
the Mayor who is the certifying officer in charge of local community projects and the 
controller of the committee who in this case is the municipal receiver (Ofoulhast-
Othamot, 2011). In accordance with the joint ministerial order, the committee in 
principle is obliged to function on the bases of identified community needs; adopt 
programs, work plans and related budgets; apportion resources to each project/program 
in accordance  with priorities projects and available income, supervise and control 
implementation of projects financed by income of the community (MINEF 2001).  Such 
programs and work plans are limited and include; conveyance of water, construction 
and maintenance of roads, bridges, electrification,  construction, maintenance and the 
equipping of educational institutions and sanitary facilities; purchase of works of art or 
sports equipment; purchase of medicine; and any other projects of interest and value to 
the community. 
 
As noted by Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011), the decision making functions of these 
committees have been hijacked by the supervisory authorities as the decisive and 
constant involvement of the divisional officers and Mayors in the operation of the local 
forest/forestry fees management committee is worth noting.  In all if not most cases, the 
divisional officer and the Mayors are the ones who take decisions on the management of 
the forestry fees and the execution of projects for the local communities. The dictatorial 
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natures of this interference and the numerous cases where committees have been 
hijacked by these actors have downgraded the process of the decentralization of forest 
resource management in the face of the local communities (MINFOF 2005). For 
instance in the District of Ebolowa, the popular and irritating mind-set of the local forest 
management committee and reports that prompt this attitude are generally negative. 
This has generated or led to the development of local resistance which include 
discursive and verbal comments such “we no longer want this policy”, “it is cheating, if 
forestry income ploughs back to the administrative and council authorities to be 
managed, they will continue to enrich themselves by it.” (group of young people from 
Fe-eyop 2001.) 
 
With respect to the Dimako Council Forest Management Consultative committee, it is 
obvious and visible from the municipal deliberations which gave rise to its creation that, 
the said management committee is subordinate to the Municipal Council and its 
responsibilities and decision making functions are very limited. Moreover, as Assembe 
(2001) and Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011) articulate, the committee responsibilities degrade 
over time following the deliberations thus relegating and limiting the participation of 
local communities in the future decision making process and management of the 
Dimako Council Forest. This could be described as an attempt by the government to 
recentralized the decision making process of forest management. 
 
4.7.2. Mismanagement of decision making functions (upward accountability as opposed 
to downward accountability) 
 
Downward accountability has been identified as the fundamental nature of democracy 
which is one of the objectives of decentralization policy as well as decentralized forest 
management as it gives room for the locals to take part in the decision making process 
of forest management and benefits that are accruing from forest. Downward 
accountability therefore establish an equalizer by given the local people the power to 
request services from elected representatives who have received powers to take 
decisions on behalf of the community. 
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However, in Cameroon, the decentralized system is structured in such a way that the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration and the central services supervise the local 
government as well as provincial governors. By virtue of this organizational structure, 
the local management committee is under the mayor who in turn is supervised by the 
senior divisional officer, and there after by the Governor. This implies that, the mayor 
of the rural local government, “in principle an elected representative”, reports to the 
senior and sub- divisional officer, who are appointed by the central state representatives 
at the regional level. “These local authorities do not feel accountable to mayors even 
less so to the local communities”. This rather upwards accountability is a powerful 
indicator of the central government’s ability to resist the decentralization process 
through the strengthening of local governments. This is an example of the reproduction 
of a relationship of submission by local authorities to the centre state.  Predicting the 
future, it can be argued that representatives of the central government at the local level  
are likely to assert their right of control over local authorities to the income accruing 
from logging of the Dimako Council Forest to the disadvantage of the local 
communities (Oyono, 2004a:102-103; Ndeloh 2013). 
 
As noted by Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011), there is evidence of very little downward 
accountability in the Dimako Council Consultative Management Committee as it relies 
organizationally and functionally on the council. The Mayor, Forestry Chief of Post, 
members of the municipal council commission and administrative authorities who serve 
as statutory members have appropriated decision making functions and powers for 
themselves relegating those members who are local community representatives to the 
background and depriving them of any substantive authority.  These members who pose 
as representatives of the local communities and whose actions are subject to the control 
of the council authorities do not render any accounts with regards to what so ever to 
anyone in the community. 
 
Also, although local communities are in principle charged with the responsibilities of 
determining the socio economic prioritized projects to be funded by the community and 
for supervising their achievements (Bigombe 2003), oftentimes, it is the divisional 
officer or Mayor who determines and set up prioritize community projects and manages 
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fund paid by logging companies. The findings of Ofoulhast-Othamot, (2011) are also in 
line with the findings of Efoua (2000:3-6) who has further articulates on what emanates 
from local discourse in some communities; 
 
“The mayor is everything: manager, president, treasurer.… We think that, if the local 
populations are to benefit from the development of the forests, they must truly assume all of the 
responsibilities that are attached to it. The mayor already manages the 40 percent that is 
allotted to the Commune, according to the forestry law; now he takes our place in managing the 
10 percent allotted to the local communities”. (Efoua 2000: 3-6.) 
 
Never the less, although these committees are dominated by mid level actors, the local 
community representatives are not left out as they have also network with mid level 
actors to form an opportunistic alliance with the aim of diverting the forestry fees meant 
for the local communities for their individual interest (Mbunya 2013). As noted by 
Oyono (2002b); Bigombe (2003) and Mbunya (2013), none of the members of this 
deliberate alliance say administrative authorities; municipal authorities or local 
community representatives bother to render any account with respect to their behaviors, 
decisions and actions to the local communities. Thus, the captures of local committees 
by administrative and municipal authorities have degraded them and weaken their 
functions. On this note, Assembe (2001:3-5) has this to say; 
 
“The committees are not accountable and do not publish reports of expenditures. The most 
striking example is the case of Toungrelo, in the Dimako District, where the committee, aided by 
highly placed accomplices, is accused of having diverted around US $14,000…. There is tacit 
complicity between the administrative authorities and some committee members.… Judging by 
what can be observed one could conclude that, from the time the directors actually receive 
money into their hands, the practice of submitting a public financial accounting is forgotten.” 
(Assembe 2001: 3-5.) 
 
4.7.3. Misuse of decision making functions and misrepresentation 
 
The primary focus of local committees is to take decisions that meet the interest and 
aspirations of the local communities. Never the less, the manner in which such 
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committees are created and operated can have an impact on the degree to which these 
decision making functions are executed in practice. This is because most of the modes 
of setting up a committee as stated in the case studies, specifically self-appointment, 
statutory appointment and vertical co-option are by nature not democratic. As shown by 
the reviews, competitive elections constitute the only genuine  democratic mode of 
representation which accounted for the selection of just 10percent of committee 
members while the others; self-appointment accounted for the election of 43percent, 
statutory appointment and vertical cooptation made up 27percent and appointment by 
consensus made up 20percent. 
 
The final result is that, most of these members who constitute representatives of the 
local communities in decentralized forest management belong to the elite group such as 
those residents outside the local communities, chiefs and the external elite. As the 
interviewees (2013) note, most community forest committees have been captured by 
urban base elite who exert influence and control from their city base. As Bouki and 
Aya’a-aya’a (2002:4-6) note, these elites quite often are the once who take decisions, 
negotiate and finalize deals with other loggers and Timber companies. As such, local 
representation in the implementation of decision making in Cameroon decentralized 
forest management is basically neo-patrimonial in nature as most of these members who 
pose as representatives of the local communities are motivated and driven by strategies 
of socio economic mobility. However, mismanagement of decision making functions is 
most glaring in the COBANKO local community forest management committee of the 
Kongo community forest as shown on the reviews. 
 
COBANKO (local community forest management committee of the Kongo community 
forest), had as responsibilities, to represent the interest of the community and act on 
their behalf. In this respect, various timber companies interested in the Kongo 
community forest were contracted by COBANKO and successive contracts signed. 
Financial transactions with regards to “purchase of equipment”, for the execution of 
community projects was also undertaken by COBANKO executive bureau. Although 
statistical information on revenue collected is inadequate because accounts are 
inconsistent, a variety of sources confirmed that more than 500 cubic meters of timber 
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were logged between 2007 and 2009; this would have amounted approximately to 
$26,500 and $29,780. These funds are managed as stated before by the COBANKO 
executive bureau.  
 
However, it is important to note that members of this management body have failed to 
respect their decision making functions as the executive bureau and most of their 
practices do not correspond legally with their official roles. Findings confirm that 
management of revenue, generated from the Kongo Community Forest is usually 
marked by “practices of self-remuneration and misappropriation of funds” informal 
negotiations between some COBANKO officials and logging companies without the 
knowledge of village community were also reported by many informants. This trend 
was confirmed by Asembe, (2003b:6); 
 
“The case of Ajeboum and Mbgwamine, known as “the dean,” is informative. When we were 
staying in the town of Lomié, we came across these two COBANKO officials negotiating the sale 
of sawn timber with unknown persons. Another buyer, who had already been to Kongo, already 
had an agreement with the entire COBANKO bureau for the purchase of the load of timber in 
question. Nevertheless, under the pretext that the first buyer had not paid the full sum due to the 
village community and had not removed the whole stock of timber sold, the two officials had 
taken it upon themselves to negotiate new commitments, presumably on behalf of the village. In 
any case, they were not playing a role appropriate for management committee representatives. 
They seemed to operate more like a private club rather than representing the objectives, of 
defending the community, laid out in the committee’s constitution” (Asembe 2003b: 6.) 
 
This goes further to confirm the reviews of Tacconni et al. (2006) and  Ofoulhast-
Othamot (2011) who state that, it is not because the government fails to transfer 
sufficient power to local institution that the authorities and officials fail to represent and 
are unaccountable to local communities but it is due to the fact that  representative 
decision making processes  of most developing countries are weak and as a result, it is 
easier for local elites and vested interest groups to manipulate the institutions and 
opportunities created by decentralization for their own interest. 
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Furthermore, the establishment and management of the Kongo Community Forest have 
been facilitated by many external actors. These actors include the De-concentrated 
MINEF Servicies (delegates SDOs), SNVs, SDDL Project, the Local NGO Network of 
Dja (ROLD), Local NGO the International Centre for Development Support (CIAD), 
and COBACO and Assene Nkou/Pallisco (logging companies) (MINEF 2004). In spite 
of the many roles played by this actors in the establishment and management of the 
forest, consulted documents, simple observations and conclusions drawn from villager’s 
comments, attest to the fact that the relationship amongst the Executive Bureau of 
COBANKO and various external actors are subjective, focusing more on the interest of 
each actor rather than mutually on the Kongo Village Community. The interest of the 
Village Community is increasingly disregarded by COBANKO, a committee which is 
in principle, meant to protect the interest of the community. This is evident by their 
social mobility and move towards the different actors. 
 
A closer examination to the alliance amongst the village management committee 
officials and external actors prove that there is a disconnection within institutions. 
“Villagers speak of new alliance between the patrons from towns and the village 
nouveaux riches”. For instance, only 9 brief meetings were held by COBANKO 
Executive Bureau two years after the inauguration of the Kongo Community Forest. No 
assessment meeting has been organized to give the villagers feedback on the 
management of proceeds from the community forest. (Asembe 2003b:6.) 
 
The logging companies started operating in the Kongo village community forest in 
2001. Revenue generated from the sale of first planks raise expectations from the local 
people. They villagers began to devise several strategies to benefit from the sale of 
timber. The need for transparency in the management of forest revenue led to the 
creation of a new management committee (KCFMC) by some elites who realized that 
COBANKO was fast becoming a ““free rider” and itself side lined in the “forestry 
game””. After a period of conflict between the two committees, a consensus was 
reached for the two management committee to jointly exercise control over the forest. 
While the KCMC serves as the implementation body, COBANKO serves as the 
decision making body. This new approach had several implications;  
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“the decision making and implementation process became very complex, dictated by power 
struggle; strategies for individual accumulation have been duplicated and a local “forestry 
elite” established; the local population has become increasingly marginalized.” (Asembe 
2003b:6.) 
 
This only serves as a confirmation to the reviews of Tacconi et al. (2006) and 
Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011) who state that, various studies on decentralization has rarely 
ever brought about improved governance through the promotion of local accountability 
and transparency and by promoting local democracy on administrative decision making. 
 
 
4.8. Respondents Critical View on Forest Resource Management in Cameroon 
 
Based on the semi structured questions posed to the interviewees, Nkembi and Ndeloh 
note with respect to the procedure used to formulate a management committee that, 
forest management committee members are supposed to be elected representatives of 
the locals as stated in the Forestry Law but on the contrary, most of those who make up 
members of council and community forest management committees are nominated, co-
opted and not voted. The same persons keep rotating and acting as councilors and at the 
same time as members of the local development committee as well as members of the 
forest resource management committees. 
 
With regards to how proceed accruing from the forest is used, both interviewees note 
that, these committees work together with the Major and seal deals with the elites and 
do not feel accountable to the local population. They further note that members of these 
committees are often the few educated persons in the community and as such are the 
ones who understand the politics of forest management and its proceeds and as such do 
not see the need to hold meetings to update or consult the local community since they 
assume that the locals know nothing about forest management. They are the sole 
decision makers while in the council, the Mayor serves as the sole decision maker in 
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matters that have to do with council forest management and its proceeds. (Nkembi, 
Ndeloh & Mbunya 2013.) 
 
The primary motive of this chapter has been to; 
 Identify and Analyse the failure of the implementation of decision making 
functions in the cases under study in the light of the reviews in chapter two  
 Identify and analyse local level outcomes of the process 
With the elaborations on these objectives and analysis of the result, the research 
question and objectives have been answered. Based on these reviews and findings from 
the research, the conclusion and recommendations will then be presented subsequently 
in chapter five. 
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5. CONCLUSION  
 
5.1. Summary  
 
This study has been on Decision Making in Decentralized Forest Resource Management 
in Cameroon with Case studies on Dimako Council and Kongo Community Forests 
respectively. The general introduction on the study has been given and focus is placed 
on remarkable administrative reforms in Cameroon since the 1990s. Of interest in this 
study has been the restructuring of Cameroon Forest Resource Management following 
these reforms in 1994. This administrative reform was predicted on the assumption that 
positive socio economic change, social justice, popular participation in the management 
of the forest and environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation will be achieved from 
the transfer of decision making functions, management responsibilities and benefits to 
local communities. However, the research problem suggest that “community-based and 
decentralized forms of local natural resource management often fail to produce 
responsible representation and downward accountability and are not democratic” as we 
have seen in the case studies in this study where poorly structured decentralization and 
transfer of administrative power to unaccountable local bodies threaten local equity, 
democracy and environmental management to the detriment of the local population. 
 
Based on these preliminary notes, the focus of the study has was to examine why the 
implementation of decision making in decentralized forest resource management has 
failed to achieve the objectives of the decentralized forest policy which is geared 
towards promoting social justice, inclusive development, democracy through 
responsible representation and local development in the Dimako Council and Kongo 
Community Forests and also to find out the possible implications and outcomes of the 
failure of the implementation of these managerial decisions on sustainable forest 
management and the development of the local community and country as whole. To this 
effect, the study has made an observation of the implementation process of the 
decentralized forest management policy in Cameroon with keen interest on the decision 
making functions and the administrative process of the implementation of this policy in 
the light of the administrative behavior of the administrators and the implications of 
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such behaviors. Specifically, the study has described the politics of decision making in 
decentralized forest management in Cameroon and its operational mechanisms in 
relation to the local population. The study has further identified the pitfalls associated 
with local level management of forest resource as well as the local level outcomes of the 
process.  
 
 Major concepts such as forest resource management and decentralization, decision 
making have been defined and a brief review has been given to show how public 
administration policies could work based on the transfer or shift of administrative 
decision making and management from the center to local authorities. However, some 
authors have argued that such transfer of decision making power/functions to local 
entities does not necessarily produce desired results as confirmed by the reviews on the 
cases under study.  
 
The decision theory which constitutes the framework of analysis in this study has also 
been reviewed and analyzed from different angles of administration and management 
but with main focused on decision making in forest resource management. Reviews 
have shown that the decision making process is always beautifully spelled out by 
decision makers in management plans. But the problem remains on whether such 
decisions are implemented as such or they just end up on paper. Secondly, most 
decision makers are caught in the decision making process by decision making traps 
making it difficult to achieve the expected results or meet the objectives. These have 
often led to severe consequences on the part of the beneficiaries and project or policy at 
stake as seen on the reviews of the cases under study. However, a review on this central 
theory has been to enable the researcher analyze and compare theory and practice. 
 
Furthermore, the procedures used in conducting this research have been provided with 
major emphasis on tools used to carry out the research and the research process in 
general. Case studies have also been presented with an effort to analyze the findings and 
with main focus on providing answers to the objectives and research questions which 
seeks to examine was to examine why decision making in decentralized forest resource 
management has failed to achieve the objectives of sustainable forest resource 
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management and local development in the Dimako Council and Kongo Community 
Forests and also to find out the possible implications and outcomes of the failure of the 
implementation of these managerial decisions on sustainable forest management and the 
development of the local community and country as whole.  Information on the cases 
has been intended to give the researcher the opportunity to triangulate with the reviews 
in Chapter two in order to provide sufficient information on the set back of this policy 
reform. These reviews have been elaborated with the sole purpose of; 
 Presenting and elaborating on the cases under study 
 Analysing the failure of the implementation of decision making functions in the 
cases under study in the light of the reviews in chapter two  
 Identifying and analysing local level outcomes of the process 
 
Findings on the reviews of these cases under study prove that, the grievances of the 
local population have been addressed at least on paper as a great deal of decision 
making power has been devolved to the body in charge of managing council and 
community forest as the law places the committee in a point of liaison with all external 
actors. However, even though the community forest in Cameroon is becoming well 
established today, the absence of management and technical services remains a key 
constrain to the rate of change when it comes to the maintenance and sustainability of 
the community forest. The slow pace of change has often been attributed to 
mismanagement of decision making functions as a result of corruption and patron client 
relationship, upward accountability instead of downward accountability which is a 
requirement of decentralization as a policy per say. As such decision making in the 
administration and decentralization of forest resource management in Cameroon is not 
only caught by the decision making trap but also by egocentric motives and 
mismanagement of decision making functions. The policy reform has thus failed to 
achieve the desired outcomes because the decision making process in this case has also 
been trapped due to the fact that, the authorities in charge and the local population as a 
whole neglect to validate the decision process. This is often due to the absence of an 
organization structure to audit the decision process thereby exposing the committee 
members and administrative authorities who serve as managers to all sorts of traps. 
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Findings also suggest that, many factors account for the failure of the new reform to 
achieve desired results and these include; a) Limited transfer of decision making 
functions to the committees and tendencies of centralization; b) Mismanagement of 
decision making functions (upward accountability as opposed to downward 
accountability); and c) Misuse of decision making functions and misrepresentation. In 
this respect, the good intensions of government policies have not been able to have an 
effect on the local population. Village management committees continue to act contrary 
to the rules spelled out in the simple management plan and the manual of norms and 
procedures. 
 
As seen in the case of the COBANKO management committee of the kongo village 
community forest, the executive bureau represents and respect the process of 
community forest management at least on paper. This is because, as the law requires, it 
is an obligation and the duty of each village management committee to render accounts 
to the local population. But as seen in this case, which is the case of most village 
management committees and as confirmed by the interviewees, no account has been 
rendered to the community member since 2001 when the first planks were sold. This is 
justified by the fact that no attempts have been made by the committee officials to 
organize an assessment meeting to give feedback on the management of the forest 
revenue despite the fact that, the committee in principle ought to organize an annual 
general assembly to submit an activity report on the process of forest management to 
the local population. As such, there is no flow of information; the villagers are kept in 
the dark as meetings are very irregular as seen in the reviews above. The effect is that, 
local population is not informed of the management mechanisms used. As such there is 
no downward accountability.  
 
In addition to this, it is disturbing to see that, a committee which is supposed to take 
decisions on all financial transactions, sign contracts; control revenue from forest and 
purchase equipment for the establishment of socioeconomic amenities does not have or 
keep a cash record or register. One begins to wonder how accounts are kept and 
managed by the management committee because as it seems, there is no clarity of 
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accounts. This is an indication of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds to the 
detriment of the local population.  
 
Moreover, the procedures for establishment and implementation of the village 
management committee are very weak and less rigid. For instance, representatives of 
various lineages in this case were not elected but appointed as confirmed by the 
interviewees (Nkembi et al. (2013). As stated above, no internal rules or regulations, 
structure, collective code of conduct, were established with regards to the management 
of the revenue generated from forest or biophysical management. Rules were less rigid 
and not explicitly spelled out. No sanctions were put in place for the mismanagement of 
funds and no framework was established for collective actions regarding expected 
income generated from the forest and forest management. This accounts for the low 
level of democracy and accountability. 
 
It can be concluded based on the findings that the decentralization of forest management 
in Cameroon is finally an interrupted process, obstructed halfway by regional level 
forces who are considered as mid-level actors and by local community chiefs. The 
failure of the central state to set up regulation mechanisms and a way to evaluate or 
keep an eye on the process has paved way for the decentralization of forest management 
resources to be captured by mid-level actors operating in a chain of net-works with their 
sole interest based on financial gains. As Oyono (2004:3); Ofoulhast-Othamot (2011) 
and Alemagi (2011) further note, this transfer of powers from the center only gave room 
for the division of forest administration and the establishment of legal “gangsterism” in 
an arena where abuse of power as a result of mismanagement of decision making 
functions and corruption was already deeply rooted. 
 
Thus, the assumption that socio economic wellbeing will inevitably improve as a result 
of the implementation of decentralized forest resource management has failed. This 
failure is attributed to several pitfalls within the process of decision making in forest 
resource management implementation. As seen in the case studies above, local 
authorities and officials receiving managerial powers are not representative or 
downwardly accountable to the local population, there is also no democracy due to 
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dictatorship from management officials who are charge with the decision making 
powers over forest management and revenue. This is partly attributed to the poor system 
of management for instance no rules are put in place to caution or place legal sanctions 
against officials in case of mismanagement or misappropriation of funds 
 
However, the Cameroon government in the area of decentralized forest resource 
management since 1994 has succeeded in devolving decision making functions and 
powers to the local authorities by enabling the creation of council forest, community 
forest, community hunting zones and local village management committee to access and 
manage forest revenue at least on paper.  Due to several pitfalls (upward accountability, 
irresponsible representation, dictatorship, poor management designs and misuse of 
decision making functions) within the implementation process of forest management, 
the impact of this devolution of powers on poverty alleviation, local democracy, equity, 
social vulnerability and environmental sustainability have not been felt. However, there 
are still possibilities of improving on this situation. 
 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
 
This author therefore enumerates the following recommendations aimed at converting 
the promises of decentralized forest management in Cameroon into reality. 
 
The outcome that is required from decentralization should be downward accountability 
and responsible representation. However, the most important step is to establish locally 
accountable representative institutions. This process can be effective by querying the 
structures of local elections in order to establish downwardly accountable bodies in the 
local arena. Without an orderly means for public participation and voice in the local 
decision, transfer of power to the local arena becomes privatization by default. 
Therefore sustainable and effective decentralization of power on natural resources 
should occur if there is proper representation. (Ribot, 2003.) 
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The governments are reluctant to build capacities before devolving power. This is due to 
inadequate human and financial resources on the part of the government. However, 
without building the capacity of the local authorities, there is no way they can gain 
experience to exercise power within their jurisdiction. The capacity of the local 
authorities should be built thought training and workshops on forest resources 
management in relation to local people. Thereafter, would it be necessary to devolve 
power. 
 
Government should develop and enforce an ethical code and persistently communicate 
its meaning as well as update its contents especially when new concerns such as the 
case in this study arise. It should institute and implement ethics as part of the 
management committee training and orientation programs as their training in ethics will 
strengthen and reinforce their ability to face ethical dilemmas and make proper and or 
suitable decisions. It should also incorporate ethics as part of performance evaluation as 
well as create an ethical environment to ensure that the actions of senior officials are 
consistent with their expectations from the community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
ADB/ADF (2004). Cameroon Country Governance Profile. Country Operations 
Department Central and West Regions 
 
ADB/ADF (2009). Country Strategic Paper 2010/2014 Cameroon. Regional 
Department Center. 
 
Agrawal, Arun & Jesse Ribot (1999). Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework 
with South Asian and West African cases. The Journal of Developing Areas. 33: 
4, 473-502. 
 
Alemagi, Dieudonne (2011). Sustainable development in Cameroon’s forestry sector: 
Progress, challenges, and strategies for improvement. Academic Journal 5: 2, 
65-72. 
 
Amariei, Liviu (2005). Legal Compliance in the Forestry Sector Case study: Cameroon 
Report to FAO/ITTO, Rome. 
 
Angnoletti, Mauro & Anderson Steven (2000). Methods and Approaches in Forest 
History. 1st  Edition. New York: CABI Publishing. 
 
Bartley, Hildreth & Gerald J. Miller (1989). Hand book of Public Administration. 1st 
Edition. NewYork: Taylor & Francis. 
 
Bazaara,  Nyangabyaki (2003). Decentralization, politics and environment in Uganda. 
Washington, DC: WRI Working Paper (Environmental Governance in Africa 
Series). 
 
Barnard, Chester I. (1938). The Functions of the Executives, Cambrige: Havard 
University Press.   
81 
 
 
 
Bernstein, Peter L. (1996). Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, New 
York: Wiley and Sons 
 
Bettinger, P., Boston K, Sirey J P & Grebner D. (2009). Forest management and 
planning. Amsterdam, Academic Press. 
 
Bigombe´, Patrice (2003). The decentralized forestry taxation system: local 
management and state’s logic.Washington, DC: WRI Working Paper 
(Environmental Governance in Africa). 
 
Bitonio (2012). Module Introduction to PA. Open University, UP, NCPAG, Diliman, 
Quezon City: Philippines 
 
Bonczek, Stephen J. (1992). Ethical Decision Making: Challenges of the 1990’s – a 
Practical Approach for Local Government. Public personnel Management 21: 1, 
75-89. 
 
Buchanan, Leigh & O’Connell Andrew (2006). A Brief History of Decision Making. 
Harvard Business Review 84: 1, 32–41. 
 
Bureau Veritas Certification (2006). Rapport public de certification—Certification de 
gestion forestière - Unité forestière d’aménagement n. 09021 WIJMA Douala 
(GWZ). France. Paris: Bureau Veritas Certification. 
 
Caiden, Gerald. E. (1971). The dynamics of public administration: guidelines to current 
transformations in theory and practice. Illinois: Dryden Press. 
 
Cameroon Law No. 94/01 of January 20, 1994 on the Regime of Forestry, Wildlife and 
Fisheries 
82 
 
 
Cameroon Country Profile. Available 15.8.2013: 
http://nl.nabc.nl/Portals/0/docs/Country%20information%20pdf/CAMEROON%
20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
 
Cameroon Forestry and Business. Available 15.8.2013: 
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors-cameroon/business/forestry/  
 
Cameroon Ministry of Territorial Administration. Available 15.8.2013: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Territorial_Administration_(Cameroo
n). 
 
Carney, Diana. & Farrington John. (1998). Natural Resource Management and 
Institutional Change London: Routledge research/ODI Development Policy  
 
Cerutti, Paolo O., Nasi  Robert. & Tacconi, Loca (2008). Sustainable forest 
management in Cameroon needs more than approved forest management plans. 
Ecology and Society 13:2, 36. Available 13.6.2013: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vo113/iss2/art36 
 
Clemen, Robert T. (1990). Making Hard Decisions, Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press. 
 
Clerk, Thomas D. & Shrode Williame A. (1979). Public -Sector Decision Structure: An 
Empirically-Based Description. Public Administration Review 39: 4, 343-354.  
 
Cooper, Terry L. (1990). The Responsible Administrator. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Court, J., Hovland I. & Young J. (2005). Bridging Research and Policy in Development: 
evidence and the change process. 1st  Edition. Warwickshire U.K: ITDG 
Publishing. 
 
83 
 
 
Cuny, Pascal, Ango A. Akem, & Ondoa Z. A. (2009). Local and Decentralized Forest 
Management in Cameroon: the Case of Kongo Community Forest. Available 
12.7.2013: http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ag131e/ag131e09.htm 
 
Davis L. S, Johnson K. N., Bettenger P. S. & Howart T. E. (2001). Forest management. 
4th Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Dawson, Roger (1993). The Confident Decision Maker: How to Make the Right 
Business and Personal Decisions Every Time. New York: William Morrow. 
 
Décret N° 2008/376 du 12 novembre 2008, President of the Republic website. Available 
9.6.2013: https://www.prc.cm/fr 
 
Deliberation No. 01/D/CR/DKO of the Dimako Municipal Council. 16.5.2013: 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/ArtclesGen.egawp15 
 
Delmer, D. Dunn (1998). The Impact of Administrative Behavior on Public 
Administration Textbook. Public Administration Quarterly 12: 3, 369-384. 
 
Denhardt, Kathryn G. (1991). Unearthing the Moral Foundations of Public 
Administration: Honor, Benevolence, and Justice. In Bowman, James S. ed. 
Ethical Frontiers in Public Management. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
 
Denhardt, Robert B. & Denhardt  Janet Vinzant (2003). The New Public Service: 
Serving, not steering. Armont NY:  ME Sharpe 
 
Dobel, J. Patrick (1990). Integrity in the Public Service. Public Administration Review 
50: 3, 354-366.  
 
Durrieu de Madron, L., Karsenty A., Loffeier E.  & Pierre J. M. (1998). Le projet 
d’aménagement pilote intégré de Dimako (Cameroun) (1992–1996). Document 
Forafri N. 7. CIRAD-Forêt. France: Montpellier. 
84 
 
 
 
Dynamics of public administration. Available 20.07.2013: 
http://books.google.fi/books/about/The_dynamics_of_public_administration.htm
l. 
 
Etoungou, P. (2003). Decentralization viewed from inside : the implementation of 
community forests in East-Cameroon. Washington, DC: WRI Working Paper 
(Environmental Governance in Africa Series) 
 
European Commission (2007). Voluntary partnership agreements. FLEGT Briefing 
Notes Number 06 - Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade. Belgium. 
Brussels: European Commission. 
 
Eversole, Robyn (2011). Community agency and community engagement: Re-
theorising participation in governance. Journal of Public Policy. 31: 1, 51-71.  
 
Finken, M. (1996). Communes et gestion municipale au Cameroun. Douala: Groupe 
Saint-Francois. 
 
Fleishman, Joel L. (1987). Self Interest and Political Integrity. In: Public Duties: The 
Moral Obligations of Government Officials. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 
 
Fomete, Nembot T. (2002). Forests and Democratic Development in Cameroon. 
Presentation at the meeting “Rethinking good governance” organized by the 
Overseas Development Insititute, UK. 
 
Fomete, Nembot T. (2003). La Fiscalite Forestiere et L’implication des Communautes 
Locales a la Gestion Forestiere au Cameroon. Documenet RDFN, No 
25Bdfid/FRR/ODL. London United Kingdom.  
 
85 
 
 
Fontana, Andrea   Prokos & Anastasia H  (2007). Interview: From Formal to 
Postmodern. Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press 
 
Foresterie Communautaire, (2004). Etat des lieux de la foresterie communautaire au 
Cameroun. 
 
Forest Transparency Info. Available 15.8.2013: 
http://www.foresttransparency.info/cameroon/2009/lessons-learnt/analysis/. 
 
Francis, Paul & Robert James (2003). Balancing Rural poverty Reduction and Citizen 
Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization Program. World 
Development 31:2. 
 
Fulmer, Robert M. (1988). The New Management.  New York: Macmilan Pub. Co. 
 
Gulick, Luther. & Urwick, L. (1937). Papers on the Science of Administration. 1st 
Edition.  New York: Institutute of Public Administration. 
 
Hickson, David J., Butler Richard J., Cray David, Mallory Geoffrey R. & Wilson David 
C. (1989). Decision and Organization - Processes of Strategic Decision Making 
and their Explainations Public Administration 67:4, 373–390.  
 
Holloman, Charles R. (1992). Using both head and heart in managerial decision-
making. Industrial management 34: 6. 
 
Huang, Yasheng (1996). Central-Local Relations in China during the Reform Era: the 
Economic and Institutional Dimensions. World Development. 24:4. 
 
Huse, Edgar F. (1979). The Modern Manager. St Paul MN: West Publishing. 
 
Hutton, Peter F. (1990). Survey Research for Managers: How to use surveys in 
management decision-making. 2nd Edition. Basingstoke: Macmilllan 
86 
 
 
 
Information on Cameroon Rainforest. Available 19.8.2013: 
http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Cameroon.htm. 
 
Information on Communes of Cameroon. Available 18.07.2013: 
http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communes of Cameroon. 
 
Information on Public Administration. Available 21.08.2013: 
http://www.allwariye.com/maqaalo/Ayanle/Public_Adminisration.pdf. 
 
Inter-African Forest Industries Association (IFIA). (2006). IFIA newsletter: is forest 
management improving in the tropics? Available 20.7.2013: 
http://www.ifiasite.com/http: 
 
Jennings, M. Kent (1963). Public Administrators and Community Decision Making. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 8: 1, 18-43. 
 
Kangas, As. (2010). Value of forest information. European Journal of Forest Research 
129: 863–874 
 
Kasfir, N. (1983). Designs and dilemmas of African decentralization. in Mawhood, P. 
Local Government in the Third World: experience of decentralisation in 
Tropical Africa. Edited. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 24–44. 
 
Kassibo, B. (2002). Participatory management and democratic decentralization of the 
Samori Forest in Babye commune, Mopti region. Mali’, paper presented at the 
World Resources Institute Workshop on Decentralisation and the Environment. 
Italy: Bellagio. 
 
Knoke Thomas, Weber M. (2006). Expanding carbon stocks in existingforests—a 
methodological approach for cost appraisal on thenenterprise level. Mitigat 
Adapt Strategic Global Change 11:579–605. 
87 
 
 
 
 Knoke, Thomas, Hahn A. & Schnieder T. (2010). Linking Inventory and Forest 
Optimisation: Information and decision-making in forest management. Springer-
Verlag Eur J Forest Res 129:771–775. 
 
Koutou, Denis Koulagn (2012). Decsion-making in Public Forest Sector: the Case of 
Cameroon. Nairobi, Kenya available online at: 
http://www.fornis.net/system/files/KOULAGA%20%20Decisionmaking%20in
%20public%20forest%20sector.%20version%2025%20Juin%2012.pdf 
 
Landau, Martin (1962). The Concept of Decision-Making in the Field of Public 
Administration, in Mailick Sidney & Van Ness Edward H.  Concepts and Issues 
in Administrative Behavior. Ed. Englewood CUffs, N.J.: Prentice-HaU. 
 
Langley, A., Mintzberg H., Pitcher P., Posada E. & Saint-Macary J. (1995). Opening up 
decision making: The view from the Black Stool. Organizational Science 6:260-
279. 
 
Larson, Anne M. (2003). Decentralisation and forest management in Latin America: 
towards a working model. Public Admin. Dev. 23: 211–226.  
 
Lungusile, N. (2003). Decentralization and natural resource management in rural South 
Africa: problems and prospects. Washington, DC: WRI Working Paper 
(Environmental Governance in Africa Series). 
 
Mahwood, Philip (1993b). Decentralization: The Concept and the Practice,” in 
Mahwood Philipp. Local Government in the Third World: Experience of 
Decentralization in Tropical Africa (2nd Edition). Johannesburg: Africa Institute 
of South-Africa. 
 
Manor, James (1999). The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
88 
 
 
 
Mapedza, Everisto (2003). Comanagement in Mafungautsi State Forest Area of 
Zimbabwe: what stake for local communities?. Washington, DC: WRI Working 
Paper (Environmental Governance in Africa Series). 
 
Mescon, Micheal H, Albert Micheal. & Khedouri Franklin. (1988). Management. 1st 
Edition. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (1999). Report of the National Seminar on 
Community Forestr. Cameroon. Yaoundé. 
 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF). (1998a). Directives nationales pour 
l’aménagement durable des forêts naturelles du Cameroun. Cameroon. Yaoundé: 
ONADEF – ITTO. 
 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF). (1998b). Guide d'élaboration des plans 
d'aménagement des forêts de production du domaine forestier permanent de la 
République du Cameroun. Cameroon. Yaoundé: Ministry of Environment and 
Forests 
 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF). (2001). Arrêté No 0222/A/MINEF du 
25 mai 2001 portant procédures d’élaboration, d’approbation, de suivi et de 
contrôle de la mise en oeuvre des plans d’aménagement des forêts de production 
du domaine forestier permanente. Cameroon. Yaoundé: Ministry of 
Environment and Forests. 
 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF). (2004). Planification de l'attribution des 
titres d'exploitation forestière. Cameroon. Yaoundé: Ministry of Environment 
and Forests.  
 
Mbunya Francis Nkemnyi (2013). PHD Researcher Environment and Development,     
University of Antwerp. Belgium. Personal Communication 10.12 
89 
 
 
 
Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) and Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO). (2005). Évaluation des ressources forestières nationales du Cameroun, 
2003–2004. Cameroon. Yaoundé : MINFOF and FAO. 
 
Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF). (2007). Bref aperçu du secteur forestier 
camerounaise. Cameroon. Yaoundé : MINFOF. 
 
Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development (MINDIC). (1996). Le commerce 
ext.rieur en chiffres. R.publique du Cameroun. Yaounde: Ministre du 
D.veloppement Industriel et Commercial.  
 
Natale, S. M., Libertella A. F. & Rothschild B. (1995). Decision-making process: The 
key to quality decisions. American Journal of Management Development 1: 4, 5-
8. 
 
Ndeloh Denis (2013). Postdoctoral research fellow, Antwerpen Zoo. Belgium Antwerp. 
Personal communication 16.12 
 
Nguiffo, Samuel (2010). Transparency in the Forest Sector of Cameroon. Center for 
Environment and Development. Annual Transparency report for Cameroon. 
 
Nkembi Louis (2013) Chief Executive Officer, Environment and Rural Development 
Foundation: Conserving Wildlife and Protecting Fragile environment (ERuDeF). 
Cameroon Buea. Personal communication 28.11 
 
Notes on decision theory. Available 13.11.2013: 
http://db.lib.uidaho.edu/ereserve/courses/s/stats/262_01/Notes01.pdf.  
 
Ofoulhast-Othamot, Gildas Allan (2011).The dangers of natural resources 
decentralization: Decentralized forest management, (local) development and the 
making of a Big Man in the Dimako Council, Cameroon. PH.D. Dissertations  
90 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh United State 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/927755673 
 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI). (2004). ODI Forestry Briefing Number 5, June 
2004 – Draft. Forest Law Enforcement and Governance: The Role of 
independent monitors in the control of forest crime. 
 
Oyono, Phil R. (2004). Institutional Deficit, Representation and Decentralized Forest 
Management in Cameroon: Elements of Natural Resource Social Theory and 
Public Policy.Working Paper Series: Environmental Governance in Africa 
 
Oyono, Phil R. (2004). One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Paradox of Natural 
Resource Managemnt Decentralization in Cameroon. Journal of Modern African 
Studies. 42: 1, 91-111. 
 
Oyono, Phil R. (2005). Profiling Local-Level Outcomes of Environmental 
Decentralizations: The Case of Cameroon`s Forests in the Congo Basin. The 
Journal of Environment and Development 14: 3, 317- 337. 
 
Oyono, Phil R. (2004). Assessing Accountability in Cameroon’s Local Forest 
Management. Are Representatives Responsive? African Journal of Political 
Science 9:1, 126-136. 
 
Oyugi, W. O. (1983). Local government in Kenya: a case of institutional decline’, in 
Mawhood. Edited. Local Government in the Third World, 109–40. 
 
Peters, Guy & Jon Pierre (1998). politicians, Bureaucrates and Administrative Reforms. 
New york: Routledge.  
 
Phillips, Nicola (1995). From Vision to beyond Teamwork: Ten Ways to Wake Up and 
Shake Up Your Company. Chicago: Irwin Professional. 
 
91 
 
 
Public administration. Available 15.8.2013: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_administration. 
 
Quimby, Ernest  (2011). Doing Qualitative Community Research: Lessons for Faculty, 
Students and the Community. Washington DC: Bentham Science Publishers. 
 
Raik, Daniela B. & Decker, Daniel J. (2007). A multi sector framework for assessing 
community-based forest management: lessons from Madagascar. Ecology and 
Society 12:1, 14. Available: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art14/ 
 
Report from Forest monitoring organization. Available 15.8.2013: 
http://www.forestsmonitor.org/fr/reports/540539/549935. 
 
Ribot, Jesse C. (2003). Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutional 
Choice and Discretionary Power Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Public 
Administration and Development. 23: 53-65. 
 
Ribot, Jesse C., Agrawal A & Larson A. M. (2006). Recentralizing While 
Decentralizing:How National Governments Reappropriate Forest Resources. 
World Development. 34: 11, 1864-86. 
 
Ribot, Jesse C. (2001). Local Actors, Powers and Accountability in African 
Decentralizations: A Review of Issues. Paper prepared for the International 
Development Research Centre of Canada and the United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development. 
 
Richter, William L. Burke Francis & Doig Jameson W. (1990). Combating Corruption 
/Encouraging Ethics – A Source Book for Public Service Ethics. Ed. 
Washington D.C: ASAP 
 
Rosenbloom, D. H. & Deborah D. G. (1989). The Practiceand Discipline of Public 
Administration: Competing Concerns in David Rosenbloom Public 
92 
 
 
Administration: Understanding Management, Politics and law in the Public 
Sector. 1st Edition. NewYork: Random House  
 
Russo, J Edward & Schoemaker P. (1990). Decision Traps, Simon and Schuster. New 
York: NY 
 
Silverman, David (1993). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, 
Text and Interaction. London: Sage. 
 
Simon, Herbert A. (1997). Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making 
Process in Administrative Organizations. 1st Edition. New York, NY: The Free 
Press 
 
Stake, Robert. E. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.  
 
Stark, Frank M. (1980). Federalism in Cameroon: the shadow and reality in  Kofele-
Kale N. An African Experiment in Nation Building: the bilingual Cameroon 
Republic since reunification. 1st edition Boulder. CO: Westview. 
 
Steiner, Susan (2007). Decentralisation and poverty: conceptual framework and 
application to Uganda. Public Admin. Dev. 27: 175–185.  
The functioning of Cameroon State Government. Available 
15.8.2013:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26431.htm. 
 
Wipo Information on Cameroon Forestry. Available 15.8.2013: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7463. 
 
York, Wilbern (1988).Types and Levels of Public Morality in Ethical Insight/Ethical 
Action Perspective for Local Government Manager. Ed.Washington D.C:ICMA   
 
93 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1.  Questionnaire 
 
1. What procedure is used to formulate a forest resource management committee 
within the council and the community? 
2. Who are the sole decision makers? 
3. How are proceeds from the forest managed or used? 
4. How often do they organize meetings to update and consult the local 
community? 
5. Are they accountable at all to the local community? 
 
Interviewees 
Mbunya Francis Nkemnyi (2013) PHD Researcher Environment and Development, 
University of Antwerp. Belgium. Personal Communication 10.12 
 
Ndeloh Denis (2013) Postdoctoral research fellow, Antwerpen Zoo. Belgium Antwerp. 
Personal communication 16.12 
 
Nkembi Louis (2013) Chief Executive Officer, Environment and Rural Development 
Foundation: Conserving Wildlife and Protecting Fragile environment (ERuDeF). 
Cameroon Buea. Personal communication 28.11 
 
 
